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RECENT CASES
CIVIL PROCEDURE-MmAnTG OF "CONTROL" IN FEDERAL
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 31 DEFINED To PROTECT POLICY
UNDERLYING TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
During World War II the United States, acting under the Trading
With the Enemy Act, vested $100,000,000 worth of plaintiff's property.-
In 1948 plaintiff, a Swiss holding corporation also known as "I.G. Cherie"
or "Interhandel," brought suit 2 for the return of its property on the ground
that it was not an enemy but a friendly neutral. The Government denied
this allegation.3 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34,4 the
Government requested discovery of a large number of the records of
H. Sturzenegger & Cie., a Swiss banking firm. Both parties agreed these
records would tend to reveal the identity of the true owners of Interhandel.
The court, noting an intimacy between Interhandel and Sturzenegger verg-
ing on identity of the two firms, found that Interhandel had control over
the documents and issued a discovery order.5 The Swiss Federal Attorney
then "confiscated" the records, leaving them in Sturzenegger's possession,
but forbidding their inspection on pain of fine and imprisonment.0 On
1. The Alien Property Custodian assumed control under 40 Stat. 415 (1917), as
amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §5(b) (1952), which "authorizes government seizure, in
time of war or national emergency, of all foreign owned or controlled property located
in the United States." Comment, 62 YALE LJ. 1210 (1953). The property, consisting
of $1,800,000 cash in six New York banks and approximately 93% of the stock of Gen-
eral Aniline & Film Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, represents about 20, of the
value of all foreign assets seized during World War II. Id. at 1211 n.8.
2. Recovery of the property was sought from the Attorney General, as successor
to the Alien Property Custodian, under the Trading With the Enemy Act, 40 Stat.
419 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 9(a) (1946), which "authorizes recovery
of seized assets by 'any person not an enemy or ally of an enemy' to the extent of such
persor's interest in the assets." Instant case at 199.
3. The Government asserted that plaintiff "engaged and participated in a con-
spiracy or common plan with I. G. Farben, a German enemy corporation . . . and
others . . . to conceal, camouflage, and cloak the ownership, control, and domination
by I. G. Farben of properties and interests in many countries of the world, including
the United States, other than Germany." Societe Internationale v. McGranery, 111
F. Supp. 435, 437 (D.D.C. 1953).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 provides: "Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefor . . . the court . . . may (1) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the
matters within the scope of the examination . . . and which are in his passession,
custody, or control. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
5. Instant case at 200, 204.
6. The "confiscation" was based on the finding that "Sturzenegger . . . could
not have produced its records without incurring criminal liability under article 47 of
the Swiss Banking Act which makes it a crime for anyone to elicit, and for the bank
to disclose, information contained in its records unless the customer whose secrecy
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Interhandel's failure to produce the Sturzenegger records, the Government
moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) (2),7 to dismiss
the complaint. The district court referred the matter to a special master
who found that the action of the Swiss Federal Attorney was authorized by
Swiss law and that Interhandel had acted in good faith in attempting to
obtain the records.8 Nevertheless, finding power under Rule 37 (b) (2) (iii),
the district court dismissed Interhandel's complaint, holding that "full pro-
duction of the papers is essential to permitting a trial of this case and cannot
be excused because of prohibition of Plaintiff's government." 9 The court
of appeals affirmed, but rested the power for dismissal on Rule 41(b)
which, while in the "trial" rather than the "discovery" section of the rules,
provides for dismissal of plaintiffs who fail to comply with court orders.10
The Supreme Court, granting certiorari because of important questions
raised as to the proper application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
reversed and remanded, holding that (1) despite the effect of Swiss law,
the Sturzenegger documents are within plaintiff's "control" within the
meaning of Rule 34; (2) the proper source of the power to dismiss was
Rule 37(b) ; 1 but that (3) Rule 37 "should not be construed to authorize
the dismissal of this complaint because of petitioner's noncompliance with a
pretrial production order when it has been due to inability, and not to
rights would be affected consents to such disclosure. Additionally . . . had the bank
produced the records it would have violated article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code which
makes it a crime for anyone to elicit secret business information and to transmit it
to a foreign official agency, or to a foreign organization or private enterprise." Meyer,
The Banking Secret and Economic Espionage in, Switzerland, 23 GE o. WAsH. L. Rv.
284, 285 (1955).
7. Fi. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) provides: "If any party . . .refuses to obey an
order made under . . . Rule 34 . . . the court may make such orders in regard to
the refusal as are just, and among others are the following: . . . (iii) An order
striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order
is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a
judgement by default against the disobedient party. ... "
8. The special master found, in substance: (1) plaintiff sustained its burden of
good faith in efforts to obtain the documents; (2) there was no evidence of collusion
between plaintiff and the Swiss government; (3) there was substantial legal basis
for the seizure under Swiss law; (4) obtaining waivers from those whose records were
involved was not a solution to the problem. Societe Internationale v. McGranery,
111 F. Supp. 435, 439 (D.D.C. 1953).
9. Societe Internationale v. McGranery, supra note 8, at 447.
10. Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 937 (1956). Authority to dismiss was also found in the district court's
inherent power. Both the district court and the court of appeals granted Interhandel
time extensions totalling well over a year to comply with the order. The original order
called for production of some 700 jackets, 140 account books, and lists of some 2,500
original documents. Societe Internationale v. Clark, 9 F.R.D. 263, 266 (D.D.C. 1949).
By July 1956 over 190,000 documents had been procured. The court of appeals finally
dismissed with prejudice, rejecting Interhandel's proposal for the appointment of a
neutral expert investigator to determine which documents were relevant on the ground
that there was no provision for such an expert in United States law. Societe Inter-
nationale v. Brownell, 243 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
11. For discussion of this problem, see Rosenberg, Sanctions To Effectuate Pre-
trial Discovery, 58 CoLUM. L. Rv. 480 (1958), cited with approval by the Court in
the instant case at 207.
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willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner." 12 Societe Internationale
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).13
In most cases, before a court has issued a production order under
Rule 34 it has required proof that the party to whom the order is issued
has "control" 14 as this word is understood in common parlance. Since
"control" rather than "custody" or "possession," has been the basic test,
if the party to whom the order is issued has the legal right to enforce a
demand for the documents, the order is validly issued 15 regardless of their
location.' 6 Thus, a production order was held validly issued against the
Government even though the records sought had been given to the State
of New York, since the records were subject to recall.r The rule also was
applied where the documents sought were physically beyond the jurisdiction
of the ordering court.' 8 But when the party lacks the legal right to comply
with an order to produce the documents, courts have not found control,' 9
even though the party to whom the order has been issued has possession.20
Once "control" has been found and the production order has been
issued, non-production (or non-compliance with any other discovery
order 21) calls into play Rule 37. This rule, in the discovery section of the
Federal Rules, provides sanctions, including dismissal, contempt, taxing of
12. Instant case at 212.
13. For prior reported opinions involving the instant suit see 8 F.R.D. 565 (D.D.C.
1948); 9 F.R.D. 263 (D.D.C. 1949); 9 F.R.D. 680 (D.D.C. 1950); 11 F.R.D.
294 (D.D.C. 1951); 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953); 15 F.R.D. 83 (D.D.C. 1953);
225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; 243 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
14. Knight-Morley Corp. v. Electroline Mfg. Co., 10 F.R.D. 400, 402-03 (N.D.
Ohio 1950).
15. Schwartz v. Travelers Ins. Co., 17 F.R.D. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (deponent,
by either granting or withholding consent, determined who should have access to
hospital records); United States v. Weinblatt, 11 F.R.D. 398, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ;
Reeves v. Pennsylvania R.R., 80 F. Supp. 107 (D. Del. 1948) (deponent had controf
of income tax returns because she had the legal right to get certified copies) ; Valen-
stein v. Bayonne Bolt Corp., 6 F.R.D. 363, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 1946) (deponent had sold
some bolts after inspection order was issued and thus had control).
16. In re Rivera, 79 F. Supp. 510, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
17. United States v. Weinblatt, 11 F.R.D. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
18. SEC v. Minas de Artesima, 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945).
19. Fisher v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 246 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1957) (de-
ponent sold car before inspection order was issued); Reeves v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
80 F. Supp. 107 (D. Del. 1948) (deponent had no legal right to get X-rays which
doctor possessed) ; Valenstein v. Bayonne Bolt Corp., 6 F.R.D. 363, 366 (E.D.N.Y.
1946) (deponent sold some bolts before inspection order was issued). Courts have
also declined to issue production orders when the documents do not exist. Richards v.
Maine Central R.R., 21 F.R.D. 593 (S.D. Me. 1957); William A. Meier Glass Co. v.
Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 11 F.R.D. 487, 491 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Eiseman v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 3 F.R.D. 338, 340 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
20. In re Harris, 27 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) ; see United States v. Kyle,
21 F.R.D. 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) (although bank could actually get possession of its
foreign branch's records, the court's interpretation of the National Banking Act deter-
mined that the foreign branch was independent and that the home bank had no legal
right to its branch's records).
21. E.g., unjustified refusal to answer question during oral deposition, FED. R. CIV.
P. 31; failure to submit to an ordered physical or mental examination, FED. R. Civ. P.
35; willful failure to appear for deposition after proper notice or failure to serve
answers to properly served interrogatories, FED R. Crv. P. 33.
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costs, and striking of pleadings, for non-compliance with a discovery order.22
It has been said that, for the most part, "the courts, exhibiting a generous
attitude toward the recusant party, have deemed it better to withhold the
thunderbolt [of penalty] on condition of future compliance than to foreclose
a determination on the merits."' ' Thus, many courts, when faced with the
problem of non-compliance with discovery orders, have felt that "the drastic
provisions . . . should be invoked only when deliberate or flagrant atti-
tude is demonstrated," 24 and, finding no such attitude, have applied no
sanctions at all. Examination of those cases withholding sanctions reveals
that future compliance with the hitherto ignored order is forthcoming,2
that substantial compliance has been made,26 or that the document sought
is not within deponent's control and the discovery order should either not
have been issued or have been revoked27 However, when an order has
been validly issued and it is evident that non-compliance is relatively certain,
or that non-compliance is deliberate or flagrant, the courts have dismissed
the case,28 assessed costs,2 9 or have placed deponent at some disadvantage
in the trial on the merits.5 0 Some difficulty has been encountered in the
application of Rule 37 in that in prescribing sanctions the Rule reads "fail-
ure" to comply at some points and "refuses" to comply at others. This has
led some courts to believe that willful failure was required before certain
of the Rule 37 sanctions could be applied. Therefore, some of these courts
have looked to Rule 41 (b) for authority to apply sanctions for non-willful
non-compliance with discovery orders.31 The Court in the instant case,
22. See note 7 supra for that part of Rule 37 that deals with non-compliance with
an order issued under Rule 34.
23. Pike & Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U. CHI. L. REv. 297, 327
(1940); see Scarlatos v. Kulukundis, 21 F.R.D. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Schesler v.
American Milk Prod. Co., 8 F.R.D. 259, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ; Dictograph Prods. v.
Kentworth Corp., 7 F.R.D. 543 (W.D. Ky. 1947) (dismissed without prejudice) ; see
also cases cited note 13 supra.
24. Grimmett v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 11 F.R-D. 335, 336 (N.D. Ohio 1951);
see Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 495.
25. Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1957); Macrina v. Smith, 18 F.R.D.
254 (E.D. Pa. 1955) ; Terry Carpenter, Ltd. v. Ideal Cement Co., 117 F. Supp. 441
(D. Neb. 1954) ; Grimmett v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., supra note 24.
26. Roth v. Paramount Picture Distrib. Corp., 8 F.R.D. 31 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
27. Haskell v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 19 F.R.D. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1956) ; Camp-
bell v. Johnson, 101 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). In these cases, the documents
sought could not be found, thus no control, as the word was then defined, existed.
28. Milewski v. Schneider Transp. Co., 238 F.2d 397 (6th Cir. 1956) (after three
extensions of time) ; Mooney v. Central Motor Lines, 222 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1955)
(deponent went on a pleasure trip rather than comply) ; Delphy v. Bernuth, Lembcke
Co., 217 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1954) (no adequate excuse); Textile Prods. v. Formax
Mfg. Corp., 13 F.R.D. 302 (E.D. Mich. 1952) (no explanation for non-compliance
was made when requested).
29. Bernat v. Pennsylvania R-R., 14 F.R.D. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
30. O'Toole v. William J. Meyer Co., 243 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1957); O'Neill v.
United States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
31. For a discussion of the confusion due to the rule's language see Rosenberg,
supra note 11, at 489-94.
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however, equated "refusal" with "failure," so that sanctions may now be
applied under Rule 37 in both situations.
3 2
The problem facing plaintiff in the instant case, that of subjecting itself
to the imposition of criminal sanctions under the law of another jurisdiction
by the act of compliance with a discovery order under the Federal Rules,
is one of first impression in United States courts.a The English courts,
however, have clearly resolved the issue by imposing sanctions, including
dismissal, for non-compliance with a discovery order.3 4 The Supreme Court
recognized the dilemma facing Interhandel: production, with the "fear of
criminal prosecution [which] constitutes a weighty excuse for nonproduc-
tion" 35 as opposed to non-production and very likely a denial of a trial
on the merits in a suit for over $100,000,000.
This situation presented several perplexing problems to the Court. A
major policy underlying the Trading With the Enemy Act-to reach
enemy interests which masquerade under neutral fronts 36 -is dependent on
full disclosure of relevant facts. This factor would tend to make the Court
adamant in demanding that foreign corporations make all relevant data
available so that a foreign claimant could not cloak vital information. Were
the Court not firm, foreign claimants could thwart the congressional
purpose by choosing, in time of war, to incorporate in nations which have
rules restricting the eliciting and disclosure of business information. 7 On
the other hand, the seizure of property which is believed to be enemy owned
would raise serious due process objections absent the Trading With the
Enemy Act provision "enabling the claimant, as of right, to obtain a full
hearing on his claim in a court having power to enforce it if found
32. "[T]his argument [the difference between 'failure' and 'refusal'] turns on too
fine a literalism and unduly accents certain distinctions found in the language of the
subsections of Rule 37." Instant case at 207.
33. The problem in the instant case differs from that in which the information
contained in the documents produced will tend to incriminate deponent under the law
of another jurisdiction. For treatment of this problem see United States v. Murdock,
284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1905); Republic of
Greece v. Koukouras, 264 Mass. 318, 162 N.E. 345 (1928).
34. The Prize Cases: Steamship "Antilla" and Other Vessels, 7 Lloyd's Prize
Cas. 401 (1918) ; Kronprinsessan Margareta, 6 Lloyd's Prize Cas. 105n. (1917). See
also The Kronprinzessin Victoria, [1919] AC. 261; The Baron Stjernblad, [1918]
A.C. 173; The Consul Corfitzon, [1917] A.C. 550. The court of appeals cited these
cases in detail, Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532, 541-42 (D.C. Cir.
1955). The Supreme Court dismissed them as "not persuasive authority on the
issue before us." Instant case at 212.
35. Instant case at 211.
36. Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U.S. 480, 485 (1947). See H. R. REP.
No. 2398, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946); U. S. TREAsURY DEP'T, ADINIsTRATION
OF THE WARTIME FINANCIAL AND PROPERTY CONTROLS OF THE UNITED STATES Gov-
EmRENT 29-30 (1942). "There is no dispute that in the beginnings of these com-
panies [Interhandel and Sturzenegger] all was German, and, specifically, all was
I. G. Farben. . . . General Aniline & Film Corporation was sponsored by Farben
and Farben operated its business." Brief for Respondents, p. 49.
37. See note 6 supra.
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meritorious." 38 Moreover, there was a strong possibility that fifth amend-
ment due process would be violated by "striking . . . a complaint because
of a plaintiff's inability, despite good faith efforts, to comply with a pre-
trial production order." 89 These considerations would cause the Court to
be reluctant to deny Interhandel a trial on the merits.
The Court first dealt with the policy underlying the Trading With the
Enemy Act by finding "control" 40 even though this departed from the
word's customary interpretation. 41 The Court evidently took note of the
fact that despite the master's finding, almost six years ago, that Interhandel
had "sustained the burden of proof placed upon it and . . . shown good
faith in its efforts [to comply with the production order]," 4 Interhandel
had since produced some 130,000 additional documents. By the Court's
finding of "control" and allowing the issuance of a production order, and by
the Court's holding that sanctions under Rule 37 may be applied whether
non-production is willful or not,4 Interhandel will continue to feel pressure
to produce any other documents that might become available. The pres-
sure will persist because of the fear that the lower court might yet apply
some sanction such as foreclosing determination of a particular issue in the
Government's favor or taxing Interhandel with the costs of the Govern-
ment's obtaining newly available documents. If the Court had not found
"control" in this case, a foreign claimant, who is the party in the "most
advantageous position to plead with its own sovereign for relaxation of
penal laws or for adoption of plans which will at the least achieve a sig-
nificant measure of compliance with the production order," 44 would be in a
better position to conceal vital information in future Trading With the
Enemy Act litigation. A "no control" holding by the Court would dis-
courage a future foreign claimant from exerting more than the minimum
effort required to support a finding of good faith which, in turn, would
mean "no control" and no subsequent threat of sanctions.
The Court then proceeded to dispose of the due process problems by
reversing the dismissal. 5  However, Mr. Justice Harlan was quick to
point out that even if no sanctions were ever applied, Interhandel did not
have an easy road ahead. He carefully stated that
38. Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239, 246 (1920) (dictum).
39. Instant case at 210. The lower courts were not disturbed by this issue. See
Societe Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 447 (D.D.C. 1953); Societe
Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532, 539-41 (D.C. Cir. 1955). For an excellent
discussion of the problem see instant case at 209-10; Comment, 62 YA.E L.J. 1248,
1254-55 (1953).
40. See text following note 10 mupra.
41. See text accompanying notes 14-20 supra.
42. Instant case at 201.
43. Id. at 205.
44. Ibid.
45. The district court may yet hear further government evidence on Interhandel's
good faith, explore plans looking toward further compliance, or may proceed directly
to a trial on the merits. Instant case at 213.
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"petitioner . . . carries the ultimate burden of proof of showing itself
not to be an 'enemy' within the meaning of the . . .Act 4 ....
It may be that in a trial on the merits, petitioner's inability to produce
specific information will prove a serious handicap in dispelling doubt
the Government might be able to inject into the case. It may be that in
the absence of complete disclosure by the petitioner, the District Court
would be justified in drawing inferences unfavorable to petitioner as to
particular events." 4
Although the Supreme Court's definition of the meaning of "control"
in Rule 34 was specifically confined to the purposes of the Trading With
the Enemy Act,48 it allows lower courts greater freedom in defining the
word and points the way for further modifications of the word's meaning
in non-Trading With the Enemy Act cases if future policy considerations
demand it.49 By clarifying the confusing language in Rule 37 50 the Court
granted broad powers to lower courts to strengthen enforcement of the dis-
covery rules. This should result in a greater fulfillment of their objectives.
The Court, by forbidding dismissal in the instant case, also revealed that,
although lower courts now have this wide discretion, abuse of such dis-
cretion will be policed in the appellate courts. Finally, the Supreme Court
demonstrated to the courts charged with their interpretation that the Fed-
eral Rules, designed to fit the needs of the litigants in the individual situa-
tion, have the flexibility necessary to accomplish that purpose.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS OF SAME
DEFENDANT BY STATE FOR CRIMEs ARIsING OUT OF SAME OccURi-
RENcB Do NOT VIoLATE FOURTEENT AMENDMENT
Petitioner was tried and acquitted on three counts for the robbery of
A, B, and C, while they were patrons of a New Jersey tavern. At the trial,
these three and two other victims of the same holdup, D and E, testified
for the prosecution. However, E was the only one of the five to positively
identify the defendant, although all had earlier identified defendant from
photographs. On an indictment similar to that used at the first trial and
46. The Trading With the Enemy Act § 2, 40 Stat. 415 (1917), as amended, 50
U.S.C. App. § 2 (1952), has been construed as including in the word "enemy" all
corporations affected with an "enemy taint." Uebersee Finanz-Korp. v. McGrath,
343 U.S. 205, 212 (1951).
47. Instant case at 212-13.
48. 'We do not say that this ruling [on control] would apply to every situation
where a party is restricted by law from producing documents over which it is
otherwise shown to have control. . . . [W]e hold only that accommodation of the
Rule in this instance to the policies underlying the . . .Act justified . . . issuing
this production order." Instant case at 205-06.
49. "Rule 34 is sufficiently flexible to be adapted to the exigencies of particular
litigation." Instant case at 206.
50. See note 32 supra.
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by employing substantially the same evidence and testimony,' the state
secured a conviction for the robbery of E at a second trial. The New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld the conviction,2 and the Supreme Court of the United
States affirmed, holding that the second trial did not constitute such "funda-
mental unfairness" as to be a violation of due process. Hoag v. New Jersey,
356 U.S. 464 (1958) . In an analogous case, Illinois petitioner's wife and
three children were found shot to death in his burning home. After the
state in two separate successive trials had obtained convictions and jury
sentences of twenty-five and forty years' imprisonment, respectively, for
the slaying of his wife and daughter,4 petitioner was tried, convicted, and
sentenced to death by a third jury for the murder of his son. The Illinois
Supreme Court rejected defendant's plea of double jeopardy.5 As in the
robbery case, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. Ciucci v.
Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958).7
1. At the second trial all five victims except E testified for the defense. E again
testified for the prosecution.
2. State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 122 A.2d 628 (1956), affirming 35 N.J. Super. 555,
114 A.2d 573 (App. Div. 1955).
3. In addition to double jeopardy, the defense of collateral estoppel was raised
in Hoag. The argument runs that the only issue contested by defendant in the first
trial was whether the defendant was present in the tavern at the time of the robbery.
A jury verdict of not guilty therefore indicates that there was reasonable doubt
whether defendant was in the tavern. Since, at the second trial the controlling, and
sole, contested issue also was defendant's presence, and the first trial had determined
this issue, the second trial was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. This
argument was adopted by three justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, State v.
Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 122 A.2d 628 (1956), and Chief Justice Warren of the Supreme
Court of the United States, instant case at 573 (dissenting opinions). The majority of
the New Jersey court rejected this contention on the ground that the jury may have
"acquitted the defendant on some other ground or because of a general insufficiency
in the State's proof." State v. Hoag, supra at 505, 122 A.2d at 632. The Supreme
Court held that since it did not possess corrective power over state courts it "would
not be justified in substituting a different view as to the basis of the jury's verdict"
The Court also "entertained grave doubts whether collateral estoppel can be regarded
as a constitutional requirement." 356 U.S. at 471.
Liberal application of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel has
been urged as a "limitation of courts' applying technical rules as to double jeopardy
in order to permit second prosecutions." Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy
and Res Judicata, 39 IowA L. REv. 317, 318 (1954). See text accompanying notes
20-25 i fra. An analysis of the feasibility of the Supreme Court's adoption of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel as a requirement of fourteenth amendment due process
is beyond the scope of this comment on the double jeopardy aspects of the two instant
cases.
4. Under Illinois law the jury fixes the penalty for murder. Fourteen years is
the minimum sentence, death the maximum. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 360 (1957).
5. People v. Ciucci, 8 Ill. 2d 619, 137 N.E.2d 40 (1956).
6. In a per curiam opinion five members of the Court held that on the record
as it stood there was no violation of due process. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan
expressed the belief that, if press clippings of statements allegedly made to reporters
by the prosecution, in which the state announced a determination to prosecute the
defendant until a death sentence was obtained, had been included in the certified record,
they might have voted to reverse. The Court granted leave to further substantiate
this claim.
7. The Supreme Court dealt with two other cases involving variants of double
jeopardy in the past term. Ladner v. United States, 355 U.S. 282 (1957), and
Bartkus v. Illinois, 355 U.S. 281 (1957). In the Ladner case a Fifth Circuit holding
that a single gun shot wounding two federal agents could be punished as two sepa-
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The Supreme Court long has held the view that in the administration
of their criminal law the states have the widest latitude consistent with the
"fundamental principles of liberty and justice." 8 Consequently, the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment has been held not to guarantee
defendants in state criminal trials all of the safeguards incorporated in the
Bill of Rights.9 Both the federal and a large majority of the state con-
stitutions have provisions prohibiting the placing of a defendant in jeopardy
twice for the same offense.'0 Despite similarity of language, variations in
the meaning and scope of "double jeopardy" have evolved between state
and federal jurisdictions. Thus, in Palko v. Connecticut "- the practice of
permitting retrial for a greater offense after reversal, upon prosecution's
appeal from an error of law, of a conviction for a lesser included offense '
2
was held not to be inconsistent with due process. Such a procedure is
banned in the federal courts.' 3 A similar disparity between state and federal
jurisdictions exists where the trial court grants a mistrial at the prosecutor's
request over defendant's objections and a second prosecution is initiated.
In Brock v. North Carollina, this situation arose when two witnesses who
were essential to the state's case refused to testify until such time as their
own legal difficulties were resolved. The Supreme Court found that the
subsequent trial did not violate due process. Unless urgent circumstances
warrant the granting of a mistrial or the reconvening of a court-martial,
similar procedure in the federal courts will be a violation of the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. 15 The test used by the Court in the
Palko and Brock decisions to determine if a second state trial violates due
process was whether the second trial was fundamentally unfair to the de-
fendant. No attempt was made to chart the specific course of what the
rate counts of assault was upheld. Conviction by Illinois for bank robbery after a
prior acquittal in federal court for the same wrongful act was affirmed in the Bartkus
case. In both, the Court divided equally, Justice Brennan not participating. How-
ever, rehearings have been granted in both cases. Bartkus v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 969
(1958).
8. Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312 (1926).
9. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (forceable self incrimination in"
state courts not a violation of due process); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1883) (indictment by a grand jury not a constitutional necessity in state prosecution
for murder).
10. "The Constitutions of all but five states, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, North Carolina, and Vermont, contain clauses forbidding double jeopardy. And
each of those five states has the prohibition against double jeopardy as part of its
common law." Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 435 (1953).
11. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
12. For a list of states permitting this practice see Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 216 n.4 (1958).
13. Green v. United States, supra note 12.
14. 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
15. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (dictum). In Wade, a wartime ad-
vance which removed key prosecution witnesses was held to be a justification for
reconvening a court-martial in a different command. However, the Court indicated
that under more normal conditions retrial for the same offense because of failure of
prosecution's witnesses would be double jeopardy. Cf. Simmons v. United States,
142 U.S. 148 (1891) (trial judge discovery of a biased jury grounds for mistrial).
1958]
112 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 107
Court called "the wavering line of due process" 1' other than to indicate that
a state attempt "to wear the accused out by a multitude of cases with
accumulated trials" might violate the "fundamental unfairness" test.17
Inasmuch as the first prosecution had not gone to a final judgment, the
second prosecution in both Palko and Brock could have been considered
merely a continuation of the first trial. This element of procedural con-
tinuity was lacking in both instant cases. Moreover, in both Palko and
Brock there was a showing that the prosecution had been hindered in the
proper presentation of its case. This element too, was lacking in Ciucci.
However, Justice Cardozo's dictum in Palko that accumulated trials are
fundamentally unfair was reiterated in both Hoag and Ciucci. Thus, while
the instant cases did not change the test to be used by the Court in deter-
mining if a second state trial of the same defendant violates due process,
they do indicate that a state lawfully may try a defendant twice for the
same or similar offenses, more readily than Palko and Brock alone would
suggest. 0
The concept of double jeopardy was developed to prevent the arbitrary
and unfair harassment of a defendant through a series of trials.' 8 The
defendant, without the vast resources of the state, can be faced with the
expense, uncertainty, and vexation of seemingly endless litigation. On the
other hand, the interest of the state in securing the conviction of felons has,
from time to time, led to situations, such as those which occurred in Palko
and Brock, where the courts have felt that the ends of criminal justice are
best served by permitting the state to present its case to a jury more than
once. Since both the federal and many state constitutions define double
jeopardy in terms of a second trial for the same offense,1 a considerable
body of case law has been built around the definition of the term "offense"
in an attempt to formulate an objective test which balances the conflicting
interests of prosecution and defendant.2 0  The test most widely used to
determine whether successive trials are in fact for the same offense is
whether or not the evidence necessary to sustain a second indictment would
have been sufficient to convict on the first.2 ' However, by either changing
the name of the victim in the indictment or selecting facts not used in the
first trial as the basis for the second prosecution, the results of the "same
evidence" rule can be avoided 22 and the concept of double jeopardy seri-
16. 344 U.S. at 428.
17. 302 U.S. at 328.
18. Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IOWA L. REv. 317
(1953).
19. E.g., U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb. .. ."
20. See Kircheimer, The Act, ttw Offense, and Double Jeopardy, 58 YAI.E L.J.
513 (1949).
21. For various state citations see ALI, ADMINIsTRATIoN OF CRIMINAL LAW:
DoUBLE JEOPARDY 27 (1935). See Rex v. Vandercomb, 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep.
455 (Crown 1796).
22. E.g., instant cases.
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ously impaired. A substitute test widely urged is the "same transaction"
or "single incident" 2 test under which one trial is a bar to a second in
situations where more than one crime or different crimes arise out of the
same act. This, however, fails to satisfy adequately the needs of the state
since some jurisdictions have rules forbidding the prosecution's bringing of
all its charges in one indictment.2 4 In some instances it may also seriously
prejudice the defendant in that by forcing the prosecution to bring all the
charges in one trial, the jury may be confused with a vast amount of evi-
dence relating to different crimes. Moreover, due to the difficulty in
defining the phrase, "same transaction," there exist wide differences among
state courts as to what constitutes the same act.s Thus, the Court has
formulated no objective test of what constitutes the same offense for the
purpose of double jeopardy in state courts. By using the concept of
"fundamental unfairness" the Court has left itself free to balance the
equities and "pick the pattern of due process out of the facts and circum-
stances of each case." 26
In the instant New Jersey case a balance of the equities does not clearly
argue for reversal of a second trial. Although no attempt was made to
halt the first trial, the state was surprised by the refusal of its witnesses
23. Wyemss v. Hopkins, 10 Q.B. 378 (1875). New Jersey has adopted the
"same transaction" test in several cases. State v. Pennsylvania R.R., 9 N.J. 194
(1952) ; State v. Mowser, 92 N.J.L. 474 (Ct Err. & App. 1919). For a discussion
of the test see Knowlton, Criminal Law and Procedure, 10 RuTGERs L. RE.v. 97 (1955).
24. E.g., UTAu CODE ANN. § 77-21-31 (1953). If a state adopted the "same
transaction" test, attempted changes or additions to an indictment necessitated by
discovery of new evidence after the case had gone to trial may be precluded by state
procedure, yet the state would be barred from bringing further action. In Wright v.
State, 37 Tex. Crim. 627 (1897), the state indicted and tried the defendant for the
theft of a horse. At the trial it was discovered that ownership of the horse was
different from that alleged in the indictment. Unless other offenses had been com-
mitted, the defendant would have escaped justice. For a discussion of various diffi-
culties involved with the differences in state criminal codes see Lugar, supra note 18,
at 340-49, and Kircheimer, supra note 20, at 513-37.
25. E.g., in Illinois the supreme court has ruled that manslaughter of two persons
in a single automobile accident is a multiple crime whereas in New Jersey it has been
held a single offense. People v. Allen, 368 Ill. 368, 14 N.E.2d 397 (1938), and State v.
Cosgrove, 103 N.J.L. 412, 135 At. 871 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927). Illinois, in People v.
Perrello, 350 Ill. 231, 182 N.E. 748 (1932), classified the robbery of several at a social
gathering as a single offense, whereas New York and California consider it multiple
offenses. People v. Rodgers, 171 N.Y. Supp. 451 (App. Div. 1918), aff'd, 226 N.Y.
671, 123 N.E. 882 (1919), and People v. Lagomarsino, 97 Cal. App. 2d 92, 217 P.2d
124 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
In drafting its Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute adopted a "same
conduct" test. The objections to this type of test (see note 24 supra and accompany-
ing text) are overcome by providing for "required joinder" of all "offenses based on
the same conduct," relief from such joinder if the court is satisfied that "justice so
requires," and provision that there may be a subsequent trial for offenses which were
unknown to the state at the first trial. MODEL PENA.L CODE §§ 1.08, 1.10, comment
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956). While the use of such a code by a state would be a great
improvement in the attempt to balance the interests and needs of both the state and
the defendant, this does not mean that it should be adopted by the Supreme Court.
If the Court were to adopt the ALI's "same conduct" test, the concomitant joinder
rules would also have to be used. This would seriously impinge upon the Court's
doctrine that the states are to have wide latitude in the administration of their criminal
law. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
26. 344 U.S. at 427-28.
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to identify the defendant after they originally had picked out a photo-
graphic likeness from police files and had identified defendant as the
robber.2 7 The defense made no showing of any prosecution harassment or
any inordinate vexation and expense. Considering a balance between the
interest of the defendant in not being overly taxed by continued litigation
and the state's interests in punishing the guilty for violating its laws and in
protecting the public, it appears that the Court reached a correct result.
However unwise (in a non-constitutional sense) the New Jersey decision
may have been, it cannot be said that there was a showing of that "funda-
mental unfairness" which "shocks the conscience" sufficient to cause the
Supreme Court, in the light of its policy to give the states wide latitude in
their criminal administration, to overrule a state court.
28  The same is not,
however, true in the Illinois case. The record of the first Ciucci trial dis-
closes no circumstances hampering an adequate presentation of the prosecu-
tion's case.29 Indeed, the first trial resulted in a conviction of the defendant
and a sentence to a substantial term of imprisonment. Thus, it would seem
that the subsequent trials were the result of a prosecutor's determination
to secure a death sentence regardless of the cost to the rights of the de-
fendant.3 0 Three successive trials, each adequately prosecuted and free from
error, with the threat of a fourth if the prosecution's demands were not met
would clearly seem to be within the scope of "accumulated multiple trials,"
and give rise to the expense, vexation, and harassment that shocks one's
sense of fair play. While no single formula will reveal when a defend-
ant is being harassed, there are a number of danger signs. Among these
are when, in successive trials of the same defendant for crimes closely
related in time and space, (1) the prosecution uses similar indictments with
only a change in the name of the victim, (2) there is no substantial change
in the identity or testimony of the witnesses, (3) there is similar real
evidence, (4) there is little or no change in the prosecution or defense
theory of the case, and (5) the same or similar factual issues are contested.
It is suggested that whenever future cases arise in which a number of these
danger signs are present, the Court should require a showing that a failure
in the first trial so prevented the jury from arriving at a fair result, that a
second trial was needed to protect the interests of the state. This will
strengthen the doctrine of double jeopardy but at the same time provide
sufficient flexibility in the rare occasions when the interests of the state
require several trials.
27. State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 499, 122 A.2d 628, 630 (1956).
28. But see note 3 supra, concerning other elements of fundamental unfairness and
note 25 supra, concerning the wisdom of state action.
29. People v. Ciucci, 8 Ill. 2d 619, 137 N.E.2d 40 (1956). The state made no
claim that in any of the three trials unusual circumstances demanded separate trials.
Its theory was that each act was a separate offense and as such separably triable.
30. The inflammatory arguments made by the prosecutor to the jury, together
with his statements to the press (see note 6 supra), also tend to support this view.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-UsE OF HANDBOOK IN FEDERAL
COURTS FOR PRE-TRiAI INDOCTRINATION OF JuoRs APPROVED
Defendants were convicted in a United States district court of attempt-
ing to evade income taxes. Motion for a new trial on the ground that
possession and use by a juror of A Handbook for Jurors was improper
and prejudicial to defendants was denied.' The court of appeals, affirming,
held that use of the Handbook, where no specific prejudice was shown,
was not improper. United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 258 F.2d
104 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 3113 (U.S. Oct. 13,
1958) (No. 258).
The prospective juror's apathy 2 and his unfamiliarity with legal ter-
minology and courtroom procedure have led some courts to instruct the
juror concerning his duties at the time he reports for service, either
through oral remarks from the bench,2 or the issuing of a written pam-
phlet or both.4 To promote uniformity in the federal districts, The Judi-
cial Conference of the United States has sanctioned A Handbook for Jurors
Serving in the United States District Courts r for optional use by district
judges.6 The Handbook seeks to inform the juror of the nature of his
duties and to familiarize him with trial procedure and legal terminology.
In addition to a brief description of the American court system, it sum-
marizes the stages of a trial, briefly distinguishes criminal and civil pro-
cedure, and instructs the juror as to proper conduct in the courtroom and
jury room. In the past year,7 three United States courts of appeals opin-
ions have spoken approvingly of the federal Handbook.8 The instant
1. One juror who had been issued the Handbook in connection with another case
and had read it twice, referred to the Handbook when the jury in the instant case was
discussing its power to recommend leniency. The court held no prejudice resulted
since the juror's statements were ignored by the other members of the panel who
requested a special instruction on the issue.
2. See Wicker, Jury Panels in Federal Courts, 22 TENN. L. REv. 203 (1952):
"An American citizen has been characterized as one who believes in trial by jury,
until he himself is summoned to serve thereon." See also Young, Apathy of the Jury,
in 65Tr MEETING, W. VA. BAR ASS'N 84 (1949).
3. See, e.g., General Instructions by Judge Thomas H. Dowd to the New Venire
of Jurors, 9 L. Soc'y J. 99 (1940); Lehigh, Statement to Petit Jurors, 15 Ky. S.B.J.
106 (1951); Moore, The West Virginia Bar Association Preliminary Remarks to
Jurors, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 323 (1941).
4. Research by the writer has revealed that trial courts in at least fifteen states
utilize written preliminary jury indoctrination. This method of instruction was first
used as early as 1925 in New York. Primary Lessons for Jurors, 11 A.B.A.J. 401
(1925). See The Judge-Jury Relationhip in the State Courts, 23 ORE. L. Rxv. 3, 5
(1943).
5. Published and distributed by authorization of the Judicial Conference of the
United States. Printed by the Federal Prison Industries, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
1955.
6. For a history of this booklet see United States v. Gordon, 253 F.2d 177, 186
(7th Cir. 1958) ; 1943 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES
16; 1953 id. at 20; 1954 id. at 21; 1955 id. at 25.
7. Instant case; Horton v. United States, 256 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1958) ; United
States v. Gordon, 253 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1958).
8. However, an earlier unanimous opinion of the Seventh Circuit held that the
use of the Handbook was improper. United States v. Gordon, unreported, 7th
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case, however, was the first in which a juror was proven to have read it,
and in which the court was forced to decide the issue of prejudice from
actual use. Holding that no prejudice resulted from that juror's use, the
instant court, considering the merits of the pamphlet, declared that dis-
tribution of the Handbook to the panel and their reading it were not im-
proper per se, and encouraged its use. State courts, too, have generally
upheld pre-trial indoctrination of jurors as commendable,9 and several have
praised the use of handbooks as an important adjunct to the administration
of justice. 10 Illinois, however, has declared that distribution of jury hand-
books is an unconstitutional encroachment upon the powers of the legis-
lature, since, by requiring a juror to read the handbook, the court is adding
to the statutory qualifications of juries as fixed by the legislature." Similar
reasoning was used in a strongly worded dissent to United States v.
Gordon.'2 This dissent, after finding specific passages prejudicial, said
that the Handbook's use constituted an invasion of the prerogatives of
Congress.
In order to perform his duties intelligently and with proper perspective,
the juror must be impressed with the importance of his function and ac-
quainted with a complex trial procedure bewildering to the uninitiated. The
prospective juror, moreover, is not unaware of the dramatics of a criminal
trial. Sources outside the control of the courts such as newspapers, enter-
tainment media,' 3 and general gossip may have created erroneous impres-
sions and prejudices. These must be corrected if the juror is to perform
his duties properly. It would seem that the use of some sort of preliminary
jury indoctrination is an effective means of eliminating such attitudes.
Moreover, the use of a written pamphlet rather than oral remarks will
provide uniform instruction among juries and will facilitate the challenging
of prejudicial statements made to the jury by making available a written
record of these remarks to the attorney.
Cir., July 19, 1957. This opinion was later withdrawn and it was held in the latest
Gordon case (supra note 7) that defendant failed to properly raise the question of
the Handbook.
9. See, e.g., Gross v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W2d 366 (Ky. 1953), where the court,
while holding the trial judge's oral remarks reversible error, commended the use of
pre-trial indoctrination.
10. See Knight v. State, 50 Ariz. 108, 115, 69 P.2d 569, 572-73 (1937) ; People v.
Lopez, 32 Cal. 2d 673, 675-77, 197 P.2d 757, 758-59 (1948) ; Ferrera v. Florida, 101
So. 2d 797, 799-801 (Fla. 1958). But see People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 216, 247, 172 N.E.
743, 755 (1930), where the court said such practice was "not to be commended, and
should be indulged, if at all, with great caution. .. ." Some older Texas cases also
are critical of any form of pre-trial jury education by the judge. Thomas v. State,
97 Tex. Crim. 432, 434, 262 S.W. 84, 85 (1924) ; Williams v. State, 89 Tex. Crim.
334, 335, 231 S.W. 110, 111 (1921).
11. People v. Schoos, 399 Ill. 527, 78 N.E.2d 245 (1948), 62 HARV. L. lZv. 139,
38 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 620. See also 2 VAND. L. Rxv. 313 (1949).
12. 253 F.2d 177, 188 (7th Cir. 1958).
13. E.g., television programs: American Broadcasting Company, Traffic Court;
Columbia Broadcasting System, The Verdict is Yours.
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While it is customary for judges to make some introductory remarks
to jurors when they are impaneled,14 it has been questioned whether the
federal courts may reduce these to a written pamphlet without specific legis-
lative authorization.15 Congress has provided methods of selection and
individual qualifications for jurors, such as age, physical ability to serve,
and mental capacity,' 0 and has indicated for what reasons citizens will be
exempt from jury service.17 Distribution of the Handbook by the Judicial
Conference to the courts does not increase these qualifications since its use
is entirely optional.' 8 Nor does distribution to jurors add to these qualifica-
tions since reading the Handbook is not a prerequisite to jury service.19
Moreover, examination of jurors after their selection 20 and decisions on
challenges for cause and favor are left to the discretion of the trial judge.21
Similarly, it is within the trial judge's discretion to determine whether his
closing charge to the jury shall be oral or written.2 Preliminary indoc-
trination would seem to be merely another facet of this wide discretion left
the trial judge by Congress to assure fair jury trials.
Much of the objection to individual handbooks concerns the content of
the pamphlet rather than the constitutional question.P Most state courts
reversing verdicts because of the use of prelminary indoctrination have done
so on the ground that statements made by the trial judge or contained in
isolated passages of the particular handbook were prejudicial.24 A quick
reference to a handbook on a specific point will result in reading out of
context. To say that a pamphlet as a whole is not prejudicial is to over-
look the fact that the untrained mind may apply specific passages to the
case at hand. Complaint has also been made that the federal Handbook
fails to emphasize the distinction between civil and criminal cases with the
result that jurors are unaware of the additional safeguards afforded
criminal defendants.2 Nevertheless, these objections can be overcome by
care in draftsmanship, emphasis by the judge and in the pamphlet itself that
the book is general in nature, and use of different handbooks or different
sections of the same handbook for civil and criminal trials.
14. See notes 3, 4 mcpra.
15. United States v. Gordon, 253 F.2d 177, 188 (7th Cir. 1958) (dissenting
opinion).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1952).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1952).
18. See notes 5, 6 supra.
19. Ibid.
20. FED. R. CPm. P. 24(a).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1952).
22. Carrado v. United States, 210 F.2d 712, 722-23 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; Copeland v.
United States, 152 F.2d 769, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Outlaw v. United States, 81 F.2d
805, 808-09 (5th Cir. 1936).
23. See, e.g., People v. Schoos, 399 Ill. 527, 78 N.E.2d 245 (1948) ; United States
v. Gordon, 253 F.2d 177, 188 (7th Cir. 1958) (dissenting opinion).
24. See, e.g., People v. Schoos, supra note 23; Gross v. Commonwealth, 256
S.W.2d 366 (Ky. 1953).
25. See United States v. Gordon, 253 F2d 177, 189 (7th Cir. 1958) (dissenting
opinion).
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While it is not to be denied that the jury system occasionally results
in irrational verdicts, 26 such occurrences may be minimized by minor reform.
Nevertheless, there are some who, believing trial by twelve impartial laymen
is a bulwark of democratic justice safeguarded by the Bill of Rights, 27 would
enshroud the jury with constitutional immunity by denying to the courts the
right to tamper with the administration of that institution.28  Probably
constitutional objections to jury handbooks are but a manifestation of this
reluctance to invade the province of a sacrosanct institution. Many con-
structive proposals for reform, such as improvement in methods of jury
selection 29 and the use of special verdicts, have been adopted. ° Like these
reforms, handbook indoctrination designed to impress upon the juror the
seriousness and importance of his function, designed to reduce confusion by
acquainting him in advance with that procedure which he will learn from
the experience of his first trial, and designed to advise him as to the juror's
proper behavior in and out of the courtroom should increase the value and
efficiency of jury trials without impinging upon the institution of lay jus-
tice.31 As the court concluded in the instant case, such practices are not
improper and should be encouraged.
EXPATRIATION-ExPATRATON FOR VOTING IN FOREIGN
POLITICAL ELECTION HELD NECESSARY AND PROPER TO CONGRESS'
FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER
Petitioner, a citizen of the United States by birth, but a resident of
Mexico for many years, sought admission into this country, claiming to be
an American citizen.' Having admitted voting in a political election of
26. For an analysis of the problem see 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTiCE § 38.02(1)
(1951). For a summary of current objections to jury trials see Palmer, On Trial:
The Jury Trial, 20 F.R.D. 65, 70-71 (1957). See also Corbin, The Jury Trial on
Trial, 14 A.B.A.J. 506 (1928).
27. For a comprehensive history of jury trials see Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors:
Their Functions, Qualifications and Selection, 36 B.U.L. Rxv. 1, 51-76 (1956).
28. See People v. Schoos, 399 Ill. 527, 78 N.E,2d 245 (1948) ; United States v.
Gordon, 253 F.2d 177, 188 (7th Cir. 1958) (dissenting opinion).
29. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-62 (1952); REFORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONIFERENCE OF
THE COmMITTEE ON SELECTION OF JURORs 10 (1942); Knox, Jury Selectio, 22 N.Y.
U.L. REv. 433 (1947) ; Otis, Selecting Federal Jurors, 29 A.B.A.J. 19 (1943) ; Vander-
bilt, supra note 27, at 67.
30. For a comprehensive discussion of the use of special verdicts see Slddmore v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948). See also, Broeder, The Functions
of the Jury: Facts or Fiction, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 386 (1954) ; Green, Blindfolding
the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. Rxv. 273 (1955). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
also aided in improving the administration of jury trials. 5 MooRE, ot. cit. supra
note 26, at 18.
31. See Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482 (1956). See
also 5 MooP, op. cit. supra note 26, § 38.02(1).
1. Petitioner was born in Texas in 1909 and moved to Mexico in 1919 or 1920.
He was admitted into the United States in both 1943 and 1944 as an alien railroad
laborer, stating that he was a native-born Mexican.
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Mexico, his exclusion was ordered by the immigration authorities on the
ground that he had expatriated himself under section 401(e) of the Na-
tionality Act of 1940.2 In a suit for a declaratory judgment 3 of citizenship,
the court of appeals upheld the federal district court's judgment for the
government, rejecting petitioner's claim that section 401(e) was uncon-
stitutional.4 The Supreme Court affirmed, four justices dissenting,5 holding
that expatriation for voting in a foreign election was reasonably necessary
to the exercise of Congress' power to regulate foreign affairs." Perez v.
Brounell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
In its first specific legislation 7 dealing with the problem of expatriation,
Congress in 1868 8 empowered an individual to surrender his citizenship by
an explicit renunciation. 9 In 1907, Congress stipulated that the performance
of certain acts by an American was to be considered an implied renunciation
of nationality.10 This principle was accorded judicial recognition in
Mackenzie v. Hare," in which an American woman who married a British
subject was held to have renounced her citizenship, at least during the
existence of her marriage.' 2 The Act of 1907 was superseded by the
2. 54 Stat. 1168, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1952). Section 401(e) provides:
"A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization,
shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign
state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over
foreign territory."
3. Petitioner acted under the Nationality Act of 1940, § 503, 54 Stat. 1171, as
amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (1952), which authorizes a person who claims a right or
privilege as a national of the United States and who is denied such right or privilege
by a governmental agency to bring suit for a declaration of nationality in a United
States district court.
4. Perez v. Brownell, 235 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1956).
5. The Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas and Whittaker dissented.
6. The courts below had also held that petitioner had expatriated himself through
the operation of § 801(j), 54 Stat. 1168, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1952), which provides for
the loss of nationality of a citizen who remains outside the jurisdiction of the United
States during time of war for the purpose of evading service in the armed forces of
the United States. The Court specifically refused to consider this provision. Instant
case at 62.
7. In 1865 Congress had passed an act to provide for the calling out of the
National Forces, which provided that persons convicted of desertion and draft evasion"were deemed and taken to have voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their rights
of citizenship. . . " Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 490. Since there is some
doubt whether the loss of rights of citizenship is equivalent to expatriation, 1868 is
chosen as the starting point for congressional recognition of expatriation.
8. 15 Stat. 223 (1868), 8 U.S.C. §1483 (1952).
9. Ibid. Historically, the common-law doctrine of perpetual allegiance, which was
that a person born in a country remained a citizen of that country no matter what
action he took to renounce his allegiance, was recognized in the United States. Ainslie
v. Martin, 9 Mass. 454 (1813); see also Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242
(1830) ; Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830). But
Congress in 1868, cognizant of the large immigrant population of the United States,
rejected this doctrine.
10. 34 Stat. 1228 (1907), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481(a), 1482, 1484(a) (1952).
11. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
12. The woman could regain her American citizenship upon the termination of
her marriage. Thus, the Chief Justice reasoned this was not really an expatriation
provision. Instant case at 69, 70.
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Nationality Act of 1940,18 which specified additional acts which would
have the result of expatriating the citizen. 14 Under this act it was held that
citizenship was lost through the performance of one of the specified acts
even though the act was performed with the subjective intent not to re-
nounce; 15 mental reservations could not be used to refute the implied intent
which the performance of the act had shown. The articulated rationale of
this doctrine was that the performance of certain acts could reasonably be
interpreted as a renunciation by the citizen himself. 1 Underlying this,
however, seemed to be the broader theory that some acts were inconsistent
with continued American allegiance. Whether this latter theory con-
stituted a distinct doctrine is not clear. A case in which one of the acts
specified by Congress was preceded by an express disavowal of an intention
to renounce would have clarified this question, but such a case apparently
never arose. The majority of the Court in Perez, in holding that Congress
has the power to expatriate a citizen whenever expatriation is necessary
and proper to the performance of its other powers, went far beyond even
the broader theory.
The only power concerning citizenship expressly granted to Congress
by the Constitution is the power to establish a uniform rule for naturaliza-
tion.17 The fourteenth amendment in terms does no more than confer
citizenship on all persons born or naturalized within the jurisdiction of the
United States.' 8 Thus, the Constitution does not explicitly supply an
answer to the question of Congress' power to divest an individual of citizen-
ship, since neither of these provisions pertains to such a contingency. The
constantly increasing involvement of the United States in international mat-
ters seems to require that Congress and the executive not be hampered in
their conduct of foreign affairs. On the other hand, even if citizenship
under the Constitution is not considered as equivalent in value to life, liberty
and property, it is hardly open to question that it is a highly prized pos-
13. Ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137 (now Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66
Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481-89 (1952)).
14. The Act of 1907 only provided for expatriation where (1) there was an
express renunciation; (2) the citizen became naturalized in a foreign state; (3) he
took an oath of allegiance to a foreign state; or (4) an American woman married
a foreign national.
15. Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1949).
16. In Savorgnan v. United States, supra note 15, at 498, Mr. Justice Burton
espoused the theory that Congress, motivated by the common-law prohibition against
expatriation without the consent of the sovereign, gave its consent to an individual's
expatriating himself in the Act of 1907. This interpretation of the doctrine of volun-
tary expatriation seems to go back to the principle of perpetual allegiance. See note 9
supra. Voluntary is also used in the sense that the act must not be performed under
duress. Stipa v. Dulles, 233 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1956).
17. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
18. The Chief Justice, dissenting in the instant case, reasoned that since the
fourteenth amendment confers citizenship, Congress cannot take it away. This theory
is buttressed by dicta in some early Court cases which indicate that the only power
that Congress has concerning citizenship is the power to establish a uniform system
of naturalization. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898);
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824).
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session,19 not to be withdrawn without good reason. Peres is the first case
decided by the Court where an individual has been expatriated without first
having acquired another nationality.20 This indicates the importance of
citizenship to the petitioner,21 and such an imposition of statelessness has
been widely condemned.
2 2
Under the renunciation doctrine the circumstances in which a citizen
could be expatriated were limited, even though the extent of this limitation
might vary depending upon which of the underlying theories was applied.
Under that doctrine, to avoid absurdity there had to be some plausible,
though not necessarily certain, connection between the act done and the
theory that the act manifested the citizen's desire to expatriate himself or
was inconsistent with continued American allegiance. In contrast, the only
limitation suggested by Perez is that the imposition of expatriation must
bear a reasonable connection to a power granted Congress by the Con-
stitution. This seems to be no real limitation, since a reasonable connec-
tion to a congressional power must be shown no matter what legislation
is being questioned.
Whether the needs of the state so outweigh the value of citizenship as
to justify the Perez doctrine is open to question. The Court's rationale
that expatriation for voting was necessary and proper to the foreign affairs
power was premised on the assumption that the voting of an American
citizen in a foreign election might embroil the United States in disputes with
foreign nations.P The animosity generated by American citizens voting in
the Saar plebiscite illustrates that this may occasionally be true,24 but such
instances in all probability will be rare. The fact that the right to vote is
within the control of the individual nation makes it unlikely that the casting
of American votes in foreign elections will be grounds for complaint. 25
There are, however, other situations in which embroilment with foreign
nations may occur. In some of these, the Perez doctrine is probably in-
sufficient to support expatriation. For example, the making of an inflam-
matory speech by an American in a foreign country is likely to be within
19. Loss of citizenship has been characterized as "more serious than a taking of
one's property, or the imposition of a fine or other penalty." Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1942) (denaturalization).
20. Instant case at 80 (dissenting opinion); 18 U. PiTr. L. R.mv. 816 (1957);
see Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1949) ; Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S.
299 (1915).
21. It should be noted that large numbers of American citizens have been expatri-
ated for voting without any showing that what they did harmed American foreign
policy. Thus, in 1949, 4,515 citizens were expatriated for voting in a foreign political
election; in 1950, 1,693; 1951, 1,401; 1952, 1,186; 1953, 2,651; 1954, 2,222; 1955, 1,237;
1956, 1,436. Brief for Respondent, app. B.
22. 1 OPPENEimi, INTrATiONAL LAW § 313 (a) (7th ed. 1948); 18 if. Pi'.
L. REv. 816 (1957) ; 64 YALE L.J. 1164, 1190-94 (1955).
23. Instant case at 60.
24. Instant case at 54.
25. In Perez there was no finding that petitioner did anything illegal by voting in
a Mexican political election. Indeed, as pointed out by the Chief Justice, it was not
until 1928 that there was a presidential election held in this country in which no alien
was permitted to vote. Instant case at 77 (dissenting opinion).
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the protection of the first amendment.28 In others, such as the serving by
Americans in foreign armies, expatriation can be supported under the exist-
ing doctrines.2 7  On the other hand, the doctrine formulated by the Court
in the instant case extends to many situations in which the chances of inter-
national involvement are virtually nil, e.g., voting in the equivalent of our
city council elections by an American who owns a home and resides for
two months out of the year at a foreign summer colony 28 Moreover, the
efficacy of the Perez doctrine seems slight. While it may be desirable to
deny that the individual is still a citizen, if it is assumed that the foreign
nation will accept such a disclaimer, responsibility can be disavowed as
effectively by branding the act as illegal under the laws of the United States.
Thus, the difficulty with the necessary and proper doctrine as applied
to expatriation is that it fails to apply to at least one situation in which the
need for congressional power is acute, helps only slightly in those situations
in which it does apply, yet endangers citizenship in many cases where the
need is absent. The apparent impossibility of formulating a constitutional
doctrine couched in terms of necessary and proper powers which will dis-
tinguish2 9 between these cases compels the conclusion that Congress' need
to use expatriation as an instrument of foreign policy is not great enough
to warrant adoption of the doctrine laid down by the instant case.
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-SOVERIGN ImmuNITY OF
MUNioIPALITY HELD No BAR TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S DEFENSE
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
In an action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act,' the City of
Newark, New Jersey, sued the United States in federal district court for
26. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 106 (1958) (concurring opinion); instant
case at 81 (dissenting opinion).
27. Serving in a foreign army can be classified as an act which is inconsistent with
continued American allegiance, since it demonstrates a close connection with a foreign
government. Also, by so serving, the individual makes himself unavailable for service
in the armed forces of the United States. Thus, one circuit court, in an apparent
attempt to limit the instant case, has construed it as approving a forfeiture of citizen-
ship only where the nature and circumstances of the allegedly expatriating conduct
have been such as to indicate some flouting of obligations inherent in American
citizenship. Jalbuena v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 379 (3d Cir. 1958).
28. The only question in these cases is whether the election is "political." The
coverage of section 401 (e) is indicated by In the Matter of F ........ 2 I. & N.
Dec. 427 (1946), where it was held that an American citizen lost her citizenship by
voting in an election in a Canadian town on the issue of whether beer and wine should
be sold.
29. The extreme difficulty of distinguishing is illustrated by Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958), decided the same day as the instant case. In holding unconsti-
tutional § 4 0 1 (g) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1169, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (8)
(1952), which provided for expatriation for a conviction of desertion during time
of war, four of the five-member majority applied the test of Perez, but resorted to
the seldom used prohibition of the eighth amendment and struck down the provision
as a cruel and unusual punishment.
1. Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.).
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damages to a city ambulance resulting from a collision with a Post Office
truck in Newark. The district court dismissed the complaint 2 because of
the contributory negligence of the city ambulance driver. Newark appealed,
claiming that under New Jersey law the doctrine of sovereign immunity
bars the defense of contributory negligence by a private person when sued
by a state or political subdivision.3 The circuit court affirmed the dismissal
holding that, although a political subdivision may sue under FTCA, New
Jersey's interpretation of sovereign immunity is not to be applied in a suit
against the United States. In allowing the Government to raise the con-
tributory negligence defense, the circuit court rejected the literal meaning
of the Federal Tort Claims Act which provides that the United States is to
be liable under state law to the same extent and under the same circum-
stances as a private party. City of Newark v. United States, 254 F.2d 93
(3d Cir. 1958).
The Federal Tort Claims Act, which waives the sovereign immunity
of the United States in certain tort actions, 4 provides, in part, that the dis-
trict courts shall have jurisdiction over all claims against the Government
for losses
"caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred." 1
The act further provides that the United States "shall be liable in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances." 0 The act substituted an organized plan of litigation for the
caprice of the private bill, which formerly had been the sole remedy of a
private party injured by the Government.7 Although no legal liability
existed, by these bills Congress had attempted to relieve the United States
of what it considered to be a moral obligation to aid those injured by torts
committed by the Government. The FTCA was passed under the title
of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and the history of the act
plainly indicates that Congress was interested in ridding itself of the
consideration of the plethora of private bills which it was unable to handle
on any just basis due to its limited time and capacity for fact finding.
8
2. City of Newark v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 917 (D.N.J. 1957).
3. Miller v. Layton, 133 N.J.L. 323, 44 A.2d 177 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945) ; Pater-
son v. Erie R.R., 78 N.J.L. 592, 75 Ad. 922 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919).
4. Special exceptions to the general waiver of immunity from suit are listed in
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1952).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1952). (Emphasis added.)
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1952). (Emphasis added.)
7. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950).
8. S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) ; H,R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 12 (1942).
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The instant court refused to follow New Jersey law which, adhering
to a minority view,9 holds that the state or a political subdivision does not
waive its sovereign immunity when it voluntarily goes into court to file suit
as plaintiff and may bar the defense of contributory negligence raised by the
defendant. The history of litigation under the act shows only two United
States Supreme Court decisions where equation of liability of the United
States with that of a private person in like circumstances was not adopted.
Both of these cases are of limited applicability. In one there was involved
the liability of the United States to a soldier injured while performing mili-
tary duties.'0 The Court held that the Government was not liable because
FTCA must be looked at as a part of the whole system for providing redress
for those injured by Government activities and that other statutes already
had provided compensation." This case has been limited to servicemen
injured incident to service. 2 The other case, Dalehite v. United States,13
involved the liability of the United States for damages caused in Texas
City 14 by the explosion of fertilizer which the Government produced, pack-
aged and shipped under foreign aid programs. The Government escaped
liability on the theory that such programs were a "discretionary function"
within the meaning of an exception to the act's waiver of federal sovereign
immunity.' 5 The case also contained dicta that the Government cannot be
held liable for "uniquely governmental" activities, nor can it be held liable
absolutely.'0 The rationale of the "uniquely governmental" theory is that
since private persons do not engage in such things as foreign aid programs
and could therefore never incur liability for such an activity, the Government
cannot be so liable. However, the Dalehite doctrines are now of doubtful
validity. The Court subsequently disapproved the "uniquely governmental"
9. Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
200 U.S. 273 (1906); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883); United States v.
Moscow-Idaho Seed Co., 92 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1937). Georgia appears to be the
only other state which adheres to the New Jersey rule. Columbus RR. v. City of
Columbus, 29 Ga. App. 8, 113 S.E. 243 (1922). Louisiana, Michigan and Wisconsin
have allowed the defense. Dicta in California, Texas, New York and Minnesota
indicate that the judiciary in these states would choose the majority view. For list
of cases see Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 827 (1948).
10. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
11. Id. at 144 n.12.
12. The Supreme Court has held that servicemen on leave, i.e., those injured by
Government activities not incident to their military service, may recover just as
civilians, though the amount of the benefits received under other statutes must be
deducted from the judgment. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). Veterans
injured by faulty Veterans Administration hospital care may recover under the act.
United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
13. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
14. See N.Y. Times, April 17, 1947, p. 1, cols. 5, 7.
15. 28 U.S.C. §2680 (1952). For a critical discussion of the "discretionary
function" exception see Note, 66 HARv. L. Ray. 488 (1953).
16. The Dalehite Court stated that the act covered only a "negligent or wrongful
act or omission" and therefore the Government could not be liable without negligence.
346 U.S. at 44-45.
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theory and held the Government liable for its negligence in performing
similar activities. The same case appeared to limit the reach of the "dis-
cretionary function" exception. 17 Viewing this decision jointly with the
more recent decision in Rayonier, Inc. v. United States 18 which held the
Government liable for the negligence of its firefighters, it appears that doubt
is also cast on the Dalehite proposition that the Government cannot be held
absolutely liable under FTCA. This decision was based in part on a Wash-
ington statute 19 making a landowner absolutely liable for certain fires. In
its other decisions the Court has consistently held that the liability of a
private person in like circumstances determines federal liability under
FTCA.2 0
To justify ignoring the literal meaning of the FTCA and the Supreme
Court precedents, the instant court cited the leading case of Holy Trinity
Church v. United States.21 That case involved a statute 2 plainly aimed
at preventing the importation of cheap, unskilled foreign labor. The statute
exempted artists, domestic help, singers, actors, lecturers and generally those
whose occupations would not compete on the unskilled labor market. Clergy-
men were not included among the specific exceptions. Holy Trinity Church
contracted with an English pastor to come to the United States to act
as its rector. It was prosecuted and fined for so doing. The Supreme
Court held that the conviction could not be sustained because, although the
act literally proscribed such a situation, Congress did not intend such a
consequence shocking to both moral and common sense. In Crooks v.
Harrelson 2 the Court attempted to set the standard for use of the doctrine
of Holy Trinity Church: "[T] he principle is to be applied to override the
-literal terms of a statute only under rare and exceptional circumstances.
* . . [T] he absurdity must be so gross as to shock the general moral or
common sense. . . . And there must be something to make plain the intent
of Congress that the letter of the statute is not to prevail." 24 In all of the
cases in which the Court has cited Holy Trinity Church as a precedent to
ignore the plain meaning of an act, there was something either in legislative
17. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). The case involved
the liability of the Government for its negligence in maintaining a lighthouse. It is
difficult to see how the foreign aid program in Dalehite could be less discretionary
than this.
18. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
19. See WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 76.04.370, 76.04.450 (1951).
20. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951) (Government must
make contribution where that is provided by local law among tortfeasors); United
States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949) (insurers may maintain action
as subrogees).
21. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
22. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332: "An act to prohibit the importa-
tion of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the
United States, its Territories and the District of Columbia."
23. 282 U.S. 55 (1930).
24. Id. at 60.
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history s 5 or in a reading of the section in question in the context of the
entire act,26 or, in criminal statutes, a literal meaning that would have re-
sulted in a shocking absurdity.27 The Court is more reluctant to apply the
Trinity Church doctrine in civil, than in criminal cases. Thus, where a
literal reading of a statute caused the Government great inconvenience in
collecting customs and seriously depleted income from that source, the Court
nevertheless refused to depart from the literal meaning even though there
was some evidence that the meaning was the result of faulty draftsmanship.
28
It appears that the instant court was extending the Trinity Church doctrine
to a case where none of these factors was present. The legislative history
of FTCA contains nothing about the necessity of states or political sub-
divisions waiving their sovereign immunity when they choose to sue under
the act.29 There is no indication of congressional intention on the subject
given by a contextual reading of the act, and the case does not involve the
application of criminal sanctions where the Trinity Church doctrine appears
to be invoked most frequently. ° Finally, although it is arguable that Con-
gress would not have waived its immunity only to be met by a similar claim
by the political subdivision of a state,'
1 a contrary holding would not be so
absurd as to fall within the Trinity Church doctrine as applied in prior cases.
Although the circuit courts are in conflict on the question of whether
the Government may be held absolutely liable under FTCA,
32 the Rayonier
25. Johnson v. Southern Pac. Ry., 196 U.S. 1 (1904) (legislative history shows
that "any car" means also locomotives because expressed purpose of act was to require
automatic couplers on all rolling stock). See also Lau Ow Bew v. United States,
144 U.S. 47 (1892).
26. Taylor v. United States, 207 U.S. 120 (1907) (reading act as a whole,
sailors on foreign ships are not to be treated as aliens and may go ashore without
officers of ship being subject to criminal penalties). See also White v. United States,
191 U.S. 545 (1903).
27. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (literal interpretation of con-
gressional resolution adopting Hawaii as a territory and making it subject to
Constitution would have freed convicted murderer and invalidated criminal convictions
between time of passage of resolution and enabling act). See also Rathbun v.
United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957) ; Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
28. Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264 (1901). It appeared that the entire statute
was poorly drafted. For instance, words were improperly included in quotations.
See also Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438 (1901).
29. Admitted by United States in instant case. City of Newark v. United States,
149 F. Supp. 917, 920 (D.N.J. 1957).
30. See cases cited note 25 supra; see also Pickett v. United States, 216 U.S. 456
(1910).
31. Such an argument is strengthened by the fact that Congress exempted the
Government from punitive damages and interest on judgments, both traditional preroga-
tives of soverign immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1952).
32. Compare United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 934 (1954) (Government liable under Uniform Aeronautics Act adopted in
South Carolina), with United States v. Taylor, 236 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1956), cert.
granted, 352 U.S. 963, dismissed per stipulation pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 60,
355 U.S. 801 (1957) (United States not absolutely liable under Tennessee statute mak-
ing owner of dangerous instrumentality liable for acts of agents even if not within scope
of employment), and Strangi v. United States, 211 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1954) (United
States not liable under common law rule imposing absolute liability for spread of fire
intentionally set).
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decision and the Supreme Court cases holding the Government liable in
most situations as a private person suggest that the next step will be
to declare the Government subject to such liability. It would seem no
more extreme to hold the Government liable for negligence with certain
defenses eliminated than to hold it absolutely liable. Further, Congress,
whether in the interest of fairness to the party injured by the Government
or for ease of administration, has clearly determined that state standards
should fix the extent of federal liability. Thus, in the situation presented
by the instant case and in other situations, such as statutes controlling the
sale of firearms to minors, where the states have eliminated the defense
of contributory negligence, it would seem that the federal courts were spe-
cifically directed not to substitute their standards of the proper extent of
tort liability for those of the states. Therefore, the instant court should
have rendered judgment against the Government which, if necessary, is
well able to protect itself against future claims of this sort by congressional
action, rather than establish a precedent for the disregarding of state law in
a case where no extreme absurdity would result.
PICKETING-STATE INJUNCTION PROH IBITn ALL PICKETING
HELD VoLATIVE o FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT
When plaintiff dairy operator rejected union demands that he reinstate
a fired employee, the ex-employee, two other workers employed by plaintiff,
and one Smith, a union official, all under the aegis of defendant local union,
began to picket plaintiff's dairy. The pickets carried a banner announcing
a strike, distributed leaflets urging prospective customers not to buy, and,
at Smith's instigation, took or pretended to take photographs of customers
entering and leaving the dairy. While one picket marched, the others re-
mained nearby. Some profanity was heard in connection with the picketing,
and on one occasion a neighbor lady called police to complain about pickets'
conduct. An injunction was granted by a Kansas court restraining defend-
ants from molesting plaintiff, intimidating his patrons, or picketing his place
of business. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed; ' "resort to intimida-
tion and threatened use of force against appellee's customers and patrons
. . . went far beyond any right of the Union employees to strike and
picket peaceably for the purpose of communicating their grievance to the
33. PROssER, TORTS 289 (2d ed. 1955) lists cases under these statutes. Such
statutes include also factory acts (for the protection of workmen), railway fencing
acts and child labor laws.
1. Newell v. Chauffeurs Union, 181 Kan. 898, 317 P.2d 817 (1957).
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public." 2  The court, especially impressed by the threat of reprisal which
it felt implied in the photographing,3 typified pickets' conduct as coercive
and found that "coercive picketing is unlawful and contrary to the public
policy expressed by the [state] legislature." 4 On petition for certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court in a four-line per curiam memorandum
reversed on authority of Thornhill v. Alabama.5  Chauffeurs Union v.
NezOell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958).
6
Thornhill, decided in 1940, was the grand progenitor of the doctrine
identifying picketing with free speech and holding unconstitutional under
the fourteenth amendment state bans on the right to picket peacefully. In
it the Supreme Court was faced with a conviction under an Alabama penal
statute banning all picketing.7 The evidence was that defendant was one
of sixteen pickets maintained by a striking union at Company's wood pre-
serving plant. On a given day he approached an employee coming to work
and told the employee, in a mild and peaceable manner, that the laborers
were on strike and that they did not want anyone to work at the plant. The
employee in fact did not go to work. The Court looked to the face of the
statute, found that it "does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable
area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit activities
that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech
or of the press," 8 and declared it void. The Court noted that the statute
2. 317 P.2d at 829. The court also held that, inasmuch as the business of the
dairy was wholly local, the state court's jurisdiction over the labor dispute was not
pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act. See note 33 infra.
3. The Kansas Supreme Court, in some slight modification of the trial court's
judgment, twice added the phrase "by the use of photography or by any other unlawful
means" to orders prohibiting intimidation of plaintiff's customers and employees. 317
P.2d at 831.
4. 317 P.2d at 829. See note 7 infra for text of the Kansas statute invoked by
the court.
5. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
6. The entire memorandum is: "Per curiam: The petition for writ of certiorari
is granted and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas is reversed. Thornhill
v. Alabana, 310 U.S. 88, 98, Third." Examination of Thornhill indicates that the
specific reference is in fact to the broad central holding of the case and fails to make
clear by what reasoning Thorithill is deemed to apply in the instant circumstances.
7. 310 U.S. at 91. The statute declared that "any person or persons, who, without
a just cause or legal excuse therefor, go near to or loiter about the premises or place
of business of any other person . . . for the purpose, or with the intent of influencing.
or inducing other persons not to trade with, buy from, sell to, have business dealings
with, or be employed by such persons . . . or who picket the works or place of
business of such other persons . . . for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or inter-
fering with or injuring any lawful business or enterprise of another, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor." Compare this sweeping prohibition with the Kansas statute
invoked in the instant case as expressing a public policy condemning coercive picketing.
The statute makes it unlawful for any person "to engage in picketing by force and
violence . . . or to picket other than in a peaceable manner." KAN. GEN. STAT.
§44-809(14) (Supp. 1955).
8. 310 U.S. at 97. The Court found that "the range of activities proscribed by
[the statute], whether characterized as picketing or loitering or otherwise, embraces
nearly every practicable, effective means whereby those interested-including the
employees directly affected-may enlighten the public on the nature and causes of a
labor dispute." Id. at 104.
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had been construed by the state courts to prohibit a single picket from
parading the sidewalk in front of the premises of an employer, speaking to
no one and carrying a sign which truthfully declared that the place was
nonunion; "the statute as thus authoritatively construed and applied leaves
room for no exceptions based upon either the number of persons engaged
in the proscribed activity, the peaceful character of their demeanor, the
nature of their dispute with an employer, or the restrained character and
the accurateness of the terminology used in notifying the public of the facts
of the dispute." 9
Thus Thornhill itself, at once equating picketing with the constitution-
ally protected right of free expression,10 and suggesting that nevertheless
the states might impose upon this right restrictions not amounting to a
blanket ban,:" was a not unambiguous overture. What followed was less
unambiguous still.12 Throughout the next eighteen years picketing labor
unions appealing to the Supreme Court for relief from state injunctions
time and again saw the injunctions sustained, but with opinions which con-
tinued to grandly pontificate upon labor's right to picket.a In spite of these
pronouncements, what one commentator has called the "continued . . .
process of dilution of Thornhill v. Alabama" '14 went on apace; 15 by 1950
9. Id. at 99.
10. "In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concern-
ing the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion
that is guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 102.
11. "It is true that the rights of employers and employees to conduct their economic
affairs and to compete with others for a share in the products of industry are subject
to modification or qualification in the interests of the society in which they exist.
This is but an instance of the power of the State to set the limits of permissible contest
open to industrial combatants." Id. at 103-04.
12. For various tellings of the oft-told tale, see, e.g., International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 287-93, 295-97 (1957); Hagen v. Culinary Workers
Alliance, 70 Wyo. 165, 178-80, 246 P.2d 778, 782-84 (1952) ; GREGORY, LABOR AND THE
LAW 341-70 (1st ed. 1946) ; Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing-Constitutionally Protected,
99 U. PA. L. Rav. 1 (1950) ; Gregory, Cowstitutional Limitations on the Regulation of
Union and Employer Conduct, 49 MIcH. L. REV. 191, 199-207 (1950); Jaffe, In
Defense of the Supremne Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 Micr. L. REv. 1037 (1943);
E. Jones, The Right To Picket-Twilight Zotw of the Constitution, 102 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 995 (1954) ; F. Jones, Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alas! Amidst Con-
fusion, A Co0nsstent Principle, 29 So. CAL. L. REv. 137 (1956) ; Price, Picketing-A
Legal Cinderella, 7 U. FLA. L. REv. 143 (1954) ; Rose, Limitations on the Power of
State To Enjoin Picketing, 41 VA. L. REv. 581 (1955) ; Teller, Picketing and Free
Speech, 56 HARv. L. REv. 180 (1942) ; Weinberg, Thornhill to Hanke-The Picketing
Puzzle, 20 U. CINc. L. Ray. 437 (1951); Williams, Picketing and Free Speech--A
Texas Primer, 30 TExAs L. REv. 206 (1951); Notes, 39 GEo. L.J. 114 (1950); 58
W. VA. L. REv. 382 (1956).
13. "Peaceful picketing is the workingman's means of communication." Milk
Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941) (in-
junction prohibiting all picketing sustained on grounds of pervasive past violence);
cf. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1949) ; Carpenters
Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 725 (1942).
14. Smith, The Supreme Court and Labor 1950-1953, 8 Sw. L.J. 1, 6 (1954).
15. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's discussion of this process in International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 287-94 (1957). Frankfurter's conclusion is that
"this series of cases, then, established a broad field in which a State, in enforcing
some public policy, whether of its criminal or its civil law, and whether announced
by its legislature or its courts, could constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing aimed
at preventing effectuation of that policy." Id. at 293.
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the Court had clearly asserted that "picketing, not being the equivalent of
speech as a matter of fact, is not its inevitable legal equivalent." "I Soon
many were convinced that Thornhill had been quietly overruled or, at the
least, limited out of meaningful existence.17 Other commentators, however,
insisted that Thornhill was still law.' 8 The Supreme Court decisions ap-
plying Thornhill were themselves apparently inconsistent.' 9 Lower courts
and commentators confessed bewilderment2 The instant case promises
only to add to this confusion.21
It has been pointed out that while all per curiams are "blind," 22 "lack
of opinion in summary reversals per curiam presents more difficulties than
other per curiams since there is no opinion of a court below to look to for
guidance." 2 The same commentators also note that "confusion becomes
extremely significant when the per curiam is used to extend a doctrine of
law. This is particularly true when the principal citation in the per curiam
16. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950) ; cf. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, concurring in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 529-30 (1951) ; compare
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Murphy, concurring in Bakery
Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) : "Picketing by an organized group is
more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the
very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irre-
spective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated."
17. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt,
354 U.S. 284, 295-97 (1957) ; Godchaux Sugars, Inc. v. Chaisson, 227 La. 146, 167,
78 So. 2d 673, 680 (1955); Burstein, Picketing and Speech, 4 LAD. L.J. 791, 803
(1953) ; Fraenkel, supra note 12, at 12; Gregory, Constitutionol Limitations on the
Regulation of Union and Employee Conduct, 49 MIcH. L. Ray. 191, 205 (1950);
Harris, Constitutional Law in 1949-1950, 45 Amd. PoL. Sci. Rav. 86, 100 (1951);
Price, supra note 12, at 172; Weinberg, supra note 12, at 482; Note, 58 W. VA. L.
REv. 382, 390 (1956).
18. E. Jones, supra note 12, at 1019; Williams, supra note 12, at 231.
19. Compare Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942), with AFL
v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), and compare International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950) with Bakery Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
20. Judge L. Hand in United States v. Dennis, 183 F2d 201, 210 (2d Cir. 1950);
Starr v. Cooks Union, 244 Minn. 558, 566, 70 N.W.2d 873, 878-79 (1955) ; Hagan v.
Culinary Workers Alliance, 70 Wyo. 165, 180, 246 P.2d 778, 784 (1952); Wein-
berg, supra note 12, at 437; Note, 39 GEo. L.J. 114, 115, 128 (1950) ; cf. F. Jones,
supra note 12, at 137-42, and authorities cited therein.
21. In context the Court's per curiam memorandum assumes the nature of a
culminant dramatic irony. Critics in recent years have come to place the blame for
persistent unclarity upon the opinions, as distinguished from the decisions, of the
Court. "[I]t is difficult to rescue the principles of law decided from the ocean of
words in which they are submerged." Chucales v. Royalty, 164 Ohio St. 214, 219,
129 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1955). "The seeker for understanding of the constitutional
protections surrounding picketing is bewildered by the din of words-literally millions
of words." Williams, supra note 12, at 206. See also E. Jones, supra note 12, at
1017 n.99; F. Jones, supra note 12, at 140-41. Now the United States Supreme Court
has handed down a decision which threatens to clamp upon the whole history of con-
fusion a crowning chaplet of confusion. This it has done without an argument,
without an opinion, without a word.
22. Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1937 and
1938, 53 HARV. L. Rav. 579, 602 (1940).
23. Note, 69 HARv. L. REv. 707, 718 (1956).
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is to a case, the facts of which are easily distinguishable, or the reasoning
of which does not seem readily applicable." 2 Thornhill held unconstitu-
tional a state statute prohibiting all picketing and reversed the conviction
under that statute of a picket whose demeanor on the picket line had been
wholly peaceable. The instant case presented a statute outlawing picketing
"other than in a peaceable manner," 5 and the express finding of the state
court that the picketing in issue was "set in a background of intimidation
and unlawful coercive pressures." 26 Under these circumstances, what does
the Supreme Court's reversal mean? Is the Court holding that the Kansas
statute, like the Alabama statute, is void on its face? Or is it reversing on
the facts 2 7 holding that the picketing herein was "peaceful"? Or is it hold-
ing that while some of the activities of the pickets may have been enjoinable,
the judgment of the state court banning all future picketing was too broad?
Investigation of the cases which to date have touched upon the delineation
of "peaceful" from "nonpeaceful" picketing may provide a framework help-
ful in determining the precise import of the holding.
Most of the picketing cases which the Court has typified as peaceful
involved the parading of a few pickets with placards, without threats, loud
noises, or any breach of the peace.2 The leading case involving non-
peaceful picketing, and the only case in which the Court has squarely faced
the question of the constitutional power of the states to enjoin picketing
accompanied by violence, was Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, Inc.2 9 This was an instance of terrorism involving fifty window
smashings, numerous beatings, the wrecking of four trucks with injury to
one driver, dynamiting of a plant and five stores, stench-bombing of other
stores, burning of a store and two trucks, and chasing of trucks by carloads
of armed men. Injunction by the trial court prohibited only acts of violence
and allowed peaceful picketing. Reversing, the Illinois Supreme Court
ordered a blanket ban. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, hold-
ing that where picketing was so "entangled with acts of violence" that "the
24. Id. at 715.
25. See note 7 supra.
26. Newell v. Chauffeurs Union, 317 P2d 817, 831 (Kan. 1957).
27. To the effect that in picketing cases the Supreme Court "has the ultimate
power to search the records in the state courts" and reexamine findings of fact, see
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941).
To the effffect that the Court will in fact not upset findings of fact unless they are
"so without warrant as to be a palpable invasion of the constitutional guarantee," see
id. at 294.
28. Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192
(1953) (one or two pickets with pasteboard; no abusive language or physical ob-
struction) ; Building Serv. Employees Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (single
picket with sign).; Bakery Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (two pickets
with placards; union member calls on customers to dissuade them from purchasing) ;
Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 725 (1942) ; Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940) ; Miller's, Inc. v. Journeymen Tailors Union, 128 N.J. Eq. 162,
15 A.2d 822 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940), rev'd per curiam, 312 U.S. 658 (1941).
29. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
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momentum of fear generated by past violence would survive even though
future picketing might be wholly peaceful," 80 a state might by blanket in-
junction ban all picketing. While thus establishing the existence of state
power in case of violence, Meadowmoor did little to locate the line between
peaceful and nonpeaceful picketing; violence in that case was so aggravated
as to be nonpeaceful under any definition. Subsequent to Meadowmoor,
three classes of cases have come before the Court which are germane to the
area of violence. In the first class, the Court has sustained state penal
statutes outlawing the use of force or violence in labor disputes; 31 the case
before the Court involved an assault in which one man was killed and an-
other severely injured.8 2 In the second class, the Court has sustained state
injunctions limited to a prohibition of acts of violence and permitting peace-
ful picketing.as These have been cases of mass close-rank picketing ob-
structing entrances and exits and accompanied by threats of bodily injury
and sometimes by actual assaults.84 An interesting somewhat similar recent
case is Youngdahl v. Rainfair8 5 in which crowds of from eight to thirty-
seven female strikers gathered across the street from a picketed factory and
set up a chorus of scabrous name-calling, singing and indecent gestures,
causing tension which required calling out of police on one occasion. Strik-
ers spread nails in the plant parking lot and in driveways of supervisors and
nonstriking workers, followed and threatened the manager, slashed tires
on a worker's car, and dropped a five-foot black snake into the factory
through a broken window. A broad injunction restraining both acts of
violence and all peaceful picketing was sustained by the Supreme Court of
Arkansas as against contentions of federal pre-emption 36 and of violation of
first and fourteenth amendment guarantees under Thornhill.37 The United
30. Id. at 294. Three justices dissented, arguing, inter alia, that the constitutional
right to picket peacefully cannot be lost by acts of violence.
31. Cole v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 345 (1949); cf. Ex parte Sanford, 144 Tex.
Crim. 430, 157 S.W2d 899 (1941), dismissed for want of federal question, Sanford v.
Hill, 316 U.S. 647 (1942).
32. Cole v. Arkansas, supra note 31; see Henderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co.,
214 Ark. 456, 217 S.W.2d 261 (1949).
33. Hotel Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 437 (1942).
Such injunctions have been attacked as entering an area pre-empted by federal legis-
lation as well as for violation of the picketer's constitutional rights. UAW v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); United Elec. Workers v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942). The problem of pre-
emption under the NLRA has been raised by holdings that, absent violence, a state
may not enjoin picketing of business concerns subject under the commerce power
to federal regulation and the NLRA. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S.
468 (1955) ; Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). Inasmuch as the quan-
tum of violence necessary to support state action as against a contention of federal
supremacy may not be identical with the quantum of violence necessary to support
the same action as against a contention of abridgment of first and fourteenth free-
doms, the line drawn by pre-emption cases is probably not controlling as to the free
speech question.
34. Cases cited note 33 supra.
35. 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
36. For brief consideration of this problem, see note 33 supra.
37. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 226 Ark. 80, 288 S.W.2d 589 (1956).
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States Supreme Court sustained the injunction insofar as it restrained
violence and threats of violence but reversed and set aside that part of the
injunction which prohibited peaceful picketing. The rationale of the Court
was federal pre-emption and not a mention was made of Thornhill; but in
vacating the blanket ban the Court distinguished Meadowmoor.3 8 The
third class of cases includes those in which some evidence of intimidation
was present in the record but which, treated by the state courts as in-
stances of peaceful picketing, were similarly treated by the Supreme Court.
In AFL v. Swing 3 9 pickets had grabbed several customers by the arm and
told them menacingly not to enter the picketed shop.40 In Cafeteria Union
v. Angelos 41 a picket had insulted customers about to enter a diner. In
both cases state courts expressely declared that they had power to enjoin
peaceful picketing not incident to a labor dispute. The Court rejected that
contention and reversed. Although a consideration of the question of
violence was thus precluded by the procedural framing of the issues, the
opinions seem to indicate that the violence present would be insufficient to
justify a blanket injunction under Meadowmoor.4 Similarly, in Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters Union v. Hanke 4  the Court seems to treat as
peaceful picketing a case in which pickets wrote down the license numbers
of persons crossing the picket line. But the state court had supported the
injunction not on grounds of violence, but on grounds that the picketing,
though peaceful, had an unlawful purpose; and on these grounds alone the
Supreme Court affirmed. The many state decisions purporting to follow
Meadowmoor do little to clarify the area. Several courts have sustained
blanket injunctions in cases of violence; 4-" others, under factual circum-
38. "Nor can we say that a pattern of violence was established which would
inevitably reappear in the event picketing were later resumed." 355 U.S. at 156. To
the extent that this language implies that, to support a blanket ban, violence must
be so inextricably involved in the picketing that it will inevitably reappear, it misreads
Meadouvmoor. The Meadowmnoor test was only that the momentum of past violence
be so great that even peaceful picketing in the future will generate an atmosphere of
terror by recollection. 312 U.S. at 294.
39. 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
40. Swing v. AFL, 372 Ill. 91, 93, 22 N.E.2d 857, 858 (1939).
41. 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
42. "'Right to free speech in the future cannot be forfeited because of dissociated
acts of past violence'. . . . Still less can the right to picket itself be taken away
merely because there may have been isolated incidents of abuse falling far short of
violence occurring in the course of the picketing." Id. at 296. See also 312 U.S.
at 325.
43. 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
44. Hanke is a key decision in the line of cases which marked out the "unlawful
purpose" doctrine summarized by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the passage cited, note
15 mtpra.
45. E.g., Local 858, Hotel Employees Union v. Jiannas, 211 Ark. 352, 200 S.W.2d
763 (1947) (crowding and obstructing entrances, milling mob of sympathizers, one
assault with brass knuckles, customers cursed and threatened, one picket intoxicated) ;
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. v. Milk Drivers Union, 238 Wis. 379, 299 N.W.
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stances almost identical, have vacated blanket injunctions as violative of
constitutional guarantees. 46 It is certainly true, however, that no case
has been found where a court has sustained a blanket injunction under cir-
cumstances of conduct as mild as that of the instant Kansas case. In most
instances, courts have refused prohibition of all picketing even following
violence substantially more severe than mere profanity and photographing
of picket-line crossers.
47
It thus appears that the Court in the instant case had at hand a body
of precedent from which might be derived a general scheme of three distinct
categories of picketing, distinguished by differing degrees of violence or
coercion and attended by different legal consequences. The first category
would comprise activity so peaceful that it is itself constitutionally protected.
This would include placarding and pamphleteering; it is essentially the
Thornhill situation. The second represents activity which, although itself
sufficiently coercive as to justify state control or prohibition, does not so
thoroughly stain all picketing with the taint of force as to justify a blanket
ban. Rainair might seem to fit this class. The third is the Meadowmoor
case of extreme violence, where the picket line so capitalizes upon fear
generated by past terrorism that even wholly peaceful future picketing is
enjoinable as a threat to the community's freedom from fear. Although
the lines which separate the categories, the relative quanta of coercion
requisite for each, are far from clear, it would seem that the instant case
might best be typified as falling in the second category. A balancing of the
pickets' right to freely air their grievances against the right of the local
citizens to be free from threats of violence would seem to call for the tailor-
ing of this injunction to meet the form of the danger, proscribing menaces
of reprisal but permitting truthful expression of the existence and nature
31 (1941) (forty to ninety-five close rank pickets obstruct entrances; delivery trucks
shadowed and harassed by cars of pickets) ; Smith v. F. & C. Eng'r Co., 225 Ark.
688, 285 S.W.2d 100 (1955) ; Steiner v. Oil Workers Union, 19 Cal. 2d 676, 123 P.2d
20 (1942); Local 181, Hotel Employees Union v. Broadway & Fourth Ave. Realty
Co., 248 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1952) ; International Assn of Carpenters Union v. Sharp,
202 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). See Hammer v. Local 211, United Textile
Workers, 34 N.J. Super. 34, 111 A.2d 308 (Ch. 1954) ; Crosby v. Rath, 136 Ohio St.
352, 25 N.E.2d 934 (1940).
46. Henderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 214 Ark. 456, 217 S.W.2d 261 (1949)
(assault of five workers with clubs, one man killed, one severely injured) ; Weyer-
hauser Timber Co. v. Everett Dist. Council of Lumber Workers, 11 Wash. 2d 503,
119 P2d 643 (1941) (500 to 600 pickets, threats of violence, cars stopped, no entry
to picketed plant permitted without union pass); Hotel Employees v. Asimos, 216
Ark. 694, 227 S.W2d 154 (1950) ; Pezold v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union, 54
Cal. App. 2d 120, 128 P.2d 611 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942); Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon
Drivers, 377 Ill. 76, 35 N.E.2d 349 (1941); Missouri Cafeteria v. McVey, 362 Mo.
583, 242 S.W2d 549 (1951); Pipe Line Workers v. H. B. Zachry Co., 276 S.W2d
876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
47. It must be recognized that often as a matter of local law a state will not
exercise its power to enjoin picketing to the full extent of its constitutional power.
In Wilkes Sportswear v. International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, 380 Pa.
164, 110 A.2d 418 (1955), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, while recognizing that
a blanket injunction would under the circumstances not transgress the constitutional
power of the court, nevertheless set aside such a blanket ban. And see authorities
cited in Annot., Injunction Against Picketing Per Se, 132 A.L.R 1218, 1224 (1941).
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of the dispute. It is regrettable that instead of merely reaffirming the broad
and now almost meaningless Thornhill generalization the Court did not
itself analyze the problem in these terms and establish by partial reversal
and thoughtful written opinion a workable scheme of legal distinctions in
this area. The holding of the Court, however, is in no way inconsistent
with the pattern of delineation suggested above and is susceptible of inter-
pretation as the mere striking down of a too-broad injunction, a holding that
the photographing activity of the pickets did not so generate an atmosphere
of terror as to call for a blanket ban. Thus construed, the holding would
not be precedent for argument that such activity as photographing picket
line crossers is itself a constitutionally protected exercise of the right of free
speech; states would not be deprived of the power to curb such practices.
It is suggested that such an interpretation of the instant case would most
reasonably reconcile the competing interests of freedom and order.4 It is
to be hoped that the Supreme Court will soon take opportunity to propound
some such scheme of balance and to provide by its decision that clarification
of the constitutional protections surrounding picketing which seems so
necessary alike to lower courts, to legislatures and to the combatants of
industrial disputes.
PRESUMPTIONS-PpsuMpTio or PERMIssIVE UsE IIEIT To
SHIFT MER ELY BuRDEIx OF GOIING FORWARD W'IT'H CIEDIBIY
EvIDEn CE AND NOT BpDE1x OF PErtsuASIo
Plaintiffs, injured in an automobile accident, obtained judgments in a
negligence action against the operator of the automobile with which their
vehicle collided. In an attempt to satisfy these judgments, suit was brought
against the owner's insurer, liable under the omnibus clause of the policy for
damage caused by one driving with the permission of the insured.- Plain-
tiffs introduced evidence tending to prove the identity of the driver, owner-
ship of the car in the insured, and the prior judgments, after which they
rested their case. At this point defendant moved for a nonsuit on the
ground that plaintiffs had failed to prove permissive use; but the trial
court denied this motion, ruling that there was a presumption that use of
the automobile was with the owner's permission. Defendant then produced
48. The Court itself has recognized that picketing is a complex "hybrid," com-
posed at once of free expression and of forcible coercion. International Bhd. of
Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 474 (1950). Any doctrine granting pro-
tection to picketing should represent the optimum possible adjustment of these conflict-
ing elements.
1. The policy provision insures: "the named insured and also . . . any person
using the automobile . . . providing the actual use of the automobile was by the
named insured or with his permission."
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oral denials of permission by the driver and the owner, and plaintiff at-
tempted to rebut this testimony by cross-examination only. After the court
charged that the presumption put upon defendant the burden of proving
lack of permission by a preponderance of the evidence, the jury returned
a verdict for plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
while upholding the trial court on the existence of a presumption of per-
missive use, granted a new trial on the ground that the presumption shifts
only the burden of going forward with credible evidence. Waters v. New
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 393 Pa. 247, 144 A.2d 354 (1958).
Many jurisdictions have increased the area of liability for the negligent
operation of an automobile by holding the owner responsible for damage
caused by a person operating the automobile with his consent.2 The stand-
ard omnibus clause a of automobile insurance policies, required by statute
in Pennsylvania 4 and numerous other states,5 accomplishes a somewhat
similar result by extending the coverage of the policy to such an operator.,
In this situation, some jurisdictions, by statute 
7 or judicial pronouncement s
recognize a presumption that the driver had the consent of the owner;
others do not 9 Prior to the instant case, the Pennsylvania courts had taken
no position on the existence of this presumption.'
0
2. E.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 402(a) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 51.12 (1943); IowA
CODE ANN. § 321.493 (1946). Some states have accomplished much the same result
by statute declaring the driver to be the agent of the owner. Cf. D.C. CODE § 40-424
(1956) ; MINN. STAT. AN. § 170.54 (1946). Others have created an agency relation-
ship by judicial pronouncement. Cf. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co. v. Childs, 201
Ore. 347, 270 P.2d 139 (1954) ; Jones v. Cook, 90 W. Va. 710, 111 S.E. 828 (1922).
Contra, Downes v. Narrell, 261 Ala. 430, 74 So. 2d 593 (1954); Smith v. Callahan,
34 Del. 129, 144 Ati. 46 (1928); Galarowicz v. Ward, 119 Utah 611, 230 P.2d 576
(1951).
3. The omnibus clause is commonly included in automobile liability insurance
policies. See RICHADS, INSURANCE, § 826 (5th ed. 1952).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §1253(c) (1949).
5. E.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE §415; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §2904 (1953);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 170.40 (1948); N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 94-q.
6. See note 1 supra.
7. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 51.12 (1943); IowA CODE ANN. § 321A93 (1946);
N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 59.
8. See cases cited note 2 m.pra, and Hanford v. Goehry, 24 Wash. 2d 859, 167 P.2d
678 (1946).
9. E.g., Roach v. Parker, 48 Del. 519, 107 A.2d 798 (1954) ; Shultz v. Swift &
Co., 210 Minn. 533, 299 N.W. 7 (1941) (permissible inference).
10. Though there are statements that pleasure vehicles have a different rule from
that applied to commercial vehicles, no court specifically dealt with the presumption
of permissive use. It is not clear whether counsel argued for such a presumption
and lost, or whether the issue never arose. See Freshkorn v. Marietta, 345 Pa. 416,
29 A.2d 15 (1942) ; Laroche v. Farm Bureau Mut. Life Ins. Co., 335 Pa. 478, 7 A.2d
361 (1939) ; Truex v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Cas. Ins. Co., 116 Pa. Super. 551,
176 Atl. 756 (1935); Powers v. Wells, 115 Pa. Super. 549, 176 Atl. 62, allocatur
refused, 117 Pa. Super. at xxix (1935). Applying Pennsylvania law, a New Hamp-
shire court also thought that denial of plaintiff's request for a presumption of per-
missive use was proper. Hinchey v. National Sur. Co., 99 N.H. 373, 111 A.2d 827
(1955). The court in the instant case relied heavily on an analogy between the
presumption of permissive use and the long-recognized presumption that a negligent
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Recognition of the presumption in the instant case seems desirable.
Although the basic fact, ownership, is itself of probative value, it is doubtful
that it alone would support a finding of permission. The most probative,
and frequently the only proof readily available on the question of permission
lies in oral testimony of the owner and driver,:" and its production is essen-
tial to a proper determination of liability. Requiring plaintiff to produce this
evidence places on him the onus of relying on adverse witnesses. On the
other hand, the insurance company can easily secure the cooperation of
these witnesses, and, therefore, it has far fewer problems in attendance and
full disclosure. 2 Moreover, since in most instances the owner will in fact
have given permission, recognition of the presumption makes more likely a
finding in accord with the balance of probability.
Having recognized the presumption, the court had still to decide what
procedural effect it should be given. Most courts adopt the Thayer theory
that a presumption shifts the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut
the presumption and has a procedural effect only if no such evidence is
introduced.' 3  As soon as rebutting evidence 14 is introduced, the presump-
tion, having served its purpose, disappears.' 5 Under the so-called "Penn-
sylvania rule," a presumption shifts not only the burden of going forward
with evidence but also the risk of non-persuasion.' 8 This is the position
driver of a commercial vehicle was acting at the time in the scope of his employment.
Cf. Kline v. Kachmar, 360 Pa. 396, 61 A.2d 825 (1948) ; Sefton v. Valley Dairy Co.,
345 Pa. 324, 28 A.2d 313 (1942) ; Hartig v. American Ice Co., 290 Pa. 21, 137 Atl.
867 (1927).
11. In most if not all non-business situations, permission to drive, if given, is
given orally and without documentation. Thus the facts of the situation and the
comprehension of them by the parties involved will normally come from their oral
testimony.
12. But defendant's position is not without its difficulties. Even with cooperative
witnesses, he must try to prove a general negative, i.e., that he did not give permission.
And to this must be added the probability that the jury is already sympathetic to
plaintiff.
13. See THAYER, A PREpImiNARY TREATIsE ON EviDENcE 313-52 (1898); 9
WIaroRE, EvIDENCE §§ 2487-91 (3d ed. 1940). The Thayer theory was adopted in
the much discussed, but unaccepted MODEL CODE OF EviDENcE rules 701-04 (1942).
14. Judicial formulations of how much or what evidence is required to rebut a
presumption are myriad, and frequently unenlightening. Courts have defined the
quantum as: "positive and uncontroverted evidence," Gandreau v. Eclipse Pioneer
Div. of Bendix Air Corp., 137 N.J.L. 666, 61 A.2d 227 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948);
"competent evidence," Wolfgang v. Burrows, 181 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 826 (1950) ; Carroll v. Carroll, 251 S.W.2d 989 (Ky. 1952) ; Henderson v.
Berce, 142 Me. 242, 50 A.2d 45 (1946) ; Suske v. Straka, 299 Minn. 408, 39 N.W.2d
745 (1949); "opposing evidence . . .produced to explain or rebut it to the satis-
faction of the triers of the facts," Hinds v. McNair, 235 Ind. 34, 129 N.E.2d 553
(1955). Even within the jurisdiction, the verbalization is shifted. Compare Shep-
herd v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N.E.2d 156 (1949), with Griffin
v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Co., 94 Ohio App. 403, 116 N.E.2d 41 (1953).
15. After the presumption disappears, the basic fact still remains to be weighed,
for what it is worth, along with all the other evidence.
16. See Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden
of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. Rav. 307, 308 (1919); Levin, Pemnsylvania and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence: Presumptions and Dead Man Statutes, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12
& n.66 (1954). E.g., Doud v. Hines, 269 Pa. 182, 112 At. 528 (1921) ("It is
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long espoused by Professor Morgan,' 7 and in accordance with which the
jury was instructed in the instant case. Another position has been adopted
in the Uniform Rules of Evidence.'8 Under the Rules a distinction is drawn
between a presumption the basic fact of which has probative value as evi-
dence of the presumed fact,19 and one the basic fact of which has no such
probative value.2 0  Presumptions of the former type shift the burden of
persuasion, while those of the latter shift only the burden of going forward.
There is some question as to whether the "Pennsylvania rule," despite its
name, is now the law of Pennsylvania. The confusion stems from the case
of Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co. 2 1 in which the central issue was the
existence of a presumption against suicide. In holding that there was no
such presumption, the court, by way of dictum, expounded the Thayer
theory.2 From that time on, cases dealing with presumptions cite Watkins
as putting Pennsylvania into the Thayer camp.3 However, there is also
post-Watkins authority that reaffirms the old Pennsylvania rule.
2 4
difficult to see how a presumption could be successfully rebutted except by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence."); Holzheimer v. Lit Bros., 262 Pa. 150, 105 Aft. 73
(1918).
17. For representative works by Professor Morgan, see MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS
op' EVmCE (1954) ; Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE at 52-65 (1942) ;
Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. RaV. 481 (1946); Morgan,
Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV. 59
(1933); Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARv. L. REV.
906 (1930).
18. Approved in 1953 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, the Uniform Rules have not as yet been adopted in any jurisdiction.
They represent an effort to clarify the law of evidence and also to meet the objections
leveled at the Model Code of Evidence.
19. UsrFoam RULE OF EVIDENCE 14(a). The comment to rule 14 states: "Nearly
all presumptions are of this sort."
20. Id. rule 14(b). A non-probative presumption "does not exist when evidence
is introduced which would support a finding of the non-existence of the presumed
fact." Compare this with the criteria for rebuttal in note 14 supra. See Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
21. 315 Pa. 497, 173 Atl. 644 (1934).
22. In Levin, supra note 16, at 14-15, it is argued that the author of the opinion,
Mr. Justice Maxey, had no intention of changing the long established "Pennsylvania
rule."
23. E.g., Kunkel v. Vogt, 354 Pa. 279, 47 A.2d 195 (1946) (presumption of
agency) ; MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 36 A2d 492 (1944) (pre-
sumption of negligence) ; In re Geho, 340 Pa. 412, 17 A.2d 342 (1941) (presumption
of validity of a will) ; Henes v. McGovern, 317 Pa. 302, 176 Atl. 503 (1935) (pre-
sumption of non-donation); see Vuille v. Pennsylvania R.R., 42 Pa. Super. 567
(1910) (presumption of negligence of last carrier of goods).
24. E.g., Middleton v. Glenn, 143 A.2d 14 (Pa. 1958) (presumption that an eight
year old child can not be contributorily negligent); In re Obici, 373 Pa. 567, 97
A.2d 49 (1953) (presumption of continuing domicile) ; Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212,
93 A.2d 451 (1953) (presumption of negligence--called "exclusive control"); Corn
v. Wilson, 365 Pa. 355, 75 A.2d 530 (1950) (presumption of payment) ; District of
Columbia's Appeal, 343 Pa. 65, 21 A.2d 883 (1941) (presumption of parentage);
In re Grenet, 332 Pa. 111, 2 A.2d 707 (1938) (presumption of payment) ; Norris v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 334 Pa. 161, 5 A.2d 114 (1939) (dictum) (presumption of
negligence).
RECENT CASES
The instant case purports to follow the Thayer theory 25 with regard
to the presumption of permissive use. But whether, in dealing with other
presumptions, the Pennsylvania court will continue to follow Thayer is
somewhat less certain. The opinion in the instant case applies that theory
without mention of either of the alternatives. Moreover, there is some
indication that in dealing with procedural effect, Pennsylvania handles
presumptions individually.2 6 An analysis of the post-Watkins cases seems
to suggest that the court was moving toward the position taken in the
Uniform Rules. Those cases holding that the burden of persuasion is
shifted involve presumptions which under the Uniform Rules would prob-
ably be classified as probative; 27 those treating presumptions as shifting
only the burden of going forward involve ones which would be considered
non-probative, or at least doubtful.28 The opinions, of course, do not
articulate this thesis, and, since it is probable that the presumption of
permissive use would be categorized as probative,29 any consistency that
could have been drawn from the cases is dissipated by the instant case.
25. See text at note 30 infra.
26. See cases cited notes 23, 24 supra. The procedural effect given to those
presumptions varied widely. It is consistent with them to regard the court's appli-
cation of Thayer or the "Pennsylvania rule" as a judgment on what procedural aid
should be given plaintiff in a given situation. To approach presumptions by giving
them a procedural effect commensurate with their purpose and desirability has been
suggested by several eminent writers. Some regard this method as too difficult to
administer. Bohlen, supra note 16; Gausewitz, Presumptionw in a One-Rule World,
5 VAND. L. Ray. 324 (1952) ; Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions,
44 HARv. L. Rav. 906 (1930).
27. The classification of presumptions as probative or non-probative is obviously
crucial in terms of the Uniform Rules. But without judicial interpretation, cate-
gorization is at best an educated conjecture. The authors of the comment to rule 14
thought that the great bulk of presumptions would fall into the probative class. Does
non-demand for twenty years, or long residence in one place, or presence of child
in a home at early age, or unexplained explosion of a bottle (the presumptions in
the cases cited note 24 supra), have "any probative value as evidence of the existence
of the presumed fact"? It seems that the answer is yes, for, in the language of the
comment to rule 14, the presumptions seem to have a "substantial backing of prob-
ability." See cases cited note 24 supra. The so-called presumption in Middleton v.
Glenn, 143 A.2d 14 (Pa. 1958), that an eight year old child cannot be contributorily
negligent, may now be classified as a rule of law.
28. There appears to be no probative value in the probate of a will, or in being
the last of several carriers of goods that would give rise to the presumed fact-validity
of the will, and negligence by the last carrier. Whether continued possession of a
chattel is at all probative of the presumed fact of non-donation can be classified as
doubtful. The same is true of the presumption of the agency of the driver from
damage done by a commercial vehicle, though in recent years the probative value
has probably increased. The presumption of negligence may be seen to depend, for
its probative value, on the particular negligent act involved. The court has given
varied treatment. Compare MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 36 A.2d
492 (1944), aith Norris v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 334 Pa. 161, 5 A.2d 114 (1939),
and Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A2d 451 (1953). See generally the cases cited
note 23 supra.
29. It seems that, with the great increase in the use of automobiles, the basic fact
of the presumption of permissive use gains in probative value. More and more the
probability is that a driver will have the permission of the owner when he takes the
car. The fact of ownership in one other than the driver thus has some value as
evidence to prove permission.
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It must be noted, however, that the insistance of the Pennsylvania
courts that credibility is always for the jury 3 0 materially alters the opera-
tion of the Thayer theory. Under Thayer, the presumption disappears the
moment rebutting evidence is introduced and plaintiff, absent other evidence,
is subject to a directed verdict. In Pennsylvania, however, the presumption
disappears only after the jury finds the rebutting evidence credible. It has
been persuasively argued 81 that, because of this, the difference between the
various theories is largely theoretical in Pennsylvania. To illustrate this
thesis, when defendant 32 introduces evidence to rebut a presumption, the
jury must find for plaintiff if it disbelieves the rebutting evidence or if it is
undecided as to its credibility, since, under either theory, the presumed fact
must then be taken as true. If, on the other hand, the jury believes the
rebutting evidence, both theories may yield a verdict for either party since
that evidence must then be weighed in determining in whose favor the
preponderance of all the evidence on the issue lies. However, if the jury is
unable to resolve the question of preponderance,3 the choice of theories
would lead to different results, since the decision must then be against the
party having the burden of persuasion. Thus, a different result will obtain
only when the jury is undecided on the substantive issue 3 4 It is doubtful
that this situation arises with any great frequency, or, if it does, that the
jury will grasp this fine distinction. Moreover, since the jury is given both
the question of credibility and the substantive issue, yet required to return
but a single verdict, it seems likely that it will avoid making separate de-
terminations even if the distinction is within its comprehension. In prac-
tice, then, the distinction between the two theories is important only in
30. The jury's power to pass on credibility has been carefully preserved in Penn-
sylvania. Said the court in Hartig v. American Ice Co., 290 Pa. 21, 26, 137 Atl.
867, 869 (1927), "Therefore, whether the presumption is rebutted is for the triers
of facts, unless the evidence to the contrary is so clear, positive, credible, uncontra-
dicted and so undisputable in weight and amount as to justify the court in holding that
a verdict against it must be set aside as a matter of law." These conditions were
met, said the Hartig court, by indisputable physical conditions, or by some indisputable
basis for mathematical tests which demonstrably overcome the presumption. In Mac-
Donald v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 36 A.2d 492 (1944), seventeen uncontra-
dicted witnesses testified that sabotage was the cause of the train wreck, but the court
reversed a directed verdict on the ground that credibility was for the jury. It seems
clear, then, that whenever testimony in rebuttal is oral, the jury will decide the
question, and owner's denial of permission cannot gain him a directed verdict. But
see Watts v. Staunton Lumber Co., 1 111. App. 2d 224, 116 N.E.2d 908 (1954).
31. See Levin, .supra note 16.
32. It is recognized that presumptions may operate for defendant as well as
plaintiff, but for clarity of discussion, the following assumes that the presumption is
operating in favor of the plaintiff.
33. For example, if the jury believed defendant's testimony, but were unable to
decide whether or not his conduct constituted "permission" to the driver, then the
judgment should be made against the party with the burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance.
34. There may also be a different result when plaintiff's uncontradicted witnesses
rebut the presumption in his favor, as he is bound by their testimony. See Scacchi v.
Montgomery, 365 Pa. 477, 75 A.2d 535 (1950).
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those relatively few cases in which, because credibility is not in issue,3 5 a
verdict may be directed for defendant.3 6 As a consequence, the instant
case is likely to have a greater impact upon jury charges than upon results
of cases.
35. See note 30 mspra.
36. This should be most rare in cases involving the presumption of permissive
use. See note 11 supra.
